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Chapter 1 
 
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW  
 
 
 
 
Economic policies are typically based on the assumption that actors do not cooperate 
voluntarily if it involves personal costs. This assumption is central in neoclassical economic 
theory where actors' behavior is attributed to the exclusive maximization of self-interest. 
Economic theory has provided accurate predictions for field behavior whenever individual 
interests are in conflict with collective interests and therefore seems to be an accurate guide for 
economic policies. Take the over-exploitation of common pool resources like fishing grounds 
as an example. Economic theory suggests that common pool resources are overexploited in the 
absence of sanctions; the actual depletion of fishing grounds in many places appears to 
corroborate the assumption that actors are self-interested and do not cooperate voluntarily to 
sustain common pool resources.  
 However, deducing that actors are self-interested from field data can be misleading. The 
problem is that the falsification of the standard assumption with field data is exceedingly 
difficult. On the one hand, observing frequent overexploitation of common pool resources can – 
but does not necessarily – imply that resource users have selfish preferences. On the other hand, 
observing some sustained common pool resources does not automatically imply that resource 
users do not have selfish preferences. Common pool resource exploitation, like most other field 
behavior, is explainable by all sorts of factors that are often uncontrollable and imperfectly 
observable. For instance, external factors like industrial pollution, an increase in the number of 
resource users, or climate change can affect resource exploitation, whereas the sustainable use 
of common pool resources can be due to social pressure, informal rules, or budget constraints 
that prevent the purchase of machinery that facilitates resource exploitation. 
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 Economic policies can only be efficient if they are based on accurate assumptions. With 
respect to the management of common pool resources, the prescriptions derived from the 
standard assumption are typically to monitor the resource exploitation by external agents or to 
privatize the resources. These prescriptions are often either exceedingly expensive or infeasible 
which could lead to the impression that common pool resources are unmanageable in some 
cases and that their overexploitation is unavoidable. If, however, the standard model was 
inaccurate and at least some resource users were not selfish but cooperative, different ways for 
successful management of common pool resources could be feasible. For example, one 
alternative way is to empower resource users to self-manage and monitor the use of resources; 
this may work, given there are cooperative resource users. Therefore, increased knowledge 
about individuals' preferences and how they influence field behavior is of utter importance for 
designing accurate policy prescriptions.  
 One approach for rigorously testing individual preferences is with laboratory 
experimentation. Numerous laboratory experiments have shown extensive and consistent 
departures from the standard assumption (for reviews see e.g. Camerer, 2003 and DellaVigna, 
forthcoming). However, it is unclear how far laboratory behavior can be used as a guide for 
field behavior or even for the recommendation of economic policies. First, it cannot be taken 
for granted that laboratory behavior can be generalized to field behavior because the laboratory 
environment usually differs systematically in various domains to the environment outside the 
laboratory (Levitt and List, 2007). For instance, subjects in the laboratory know that an 
experimenter scrutinizes them, which could make them behave differently than in naturally 
occurring situations (e.g. Orne, 1962). Moreover, by abstracting from the situational 
complexities in the field, it is possible that important factors which determine field behavior to 
a large extent are neglected or cannot be simulated in the laboratory. Thus, simply extrapolating 
laboratory behavior to field behavior and suggesting policy recommendations based on 
laboratory findings seems premature. 
 One possibility for testing the relevance of laboratory behavior as a predictor for field 
behavior is by combining laboratory preference measures and field behavior from the same 
individuals. This approach can circumvent the problems mentioned above that occur if the 
researcher has only access to either laboratory or field data. In particular, if there are 
relationships between laboratory and field behavior, it provides evidence that laboratory 
behavior is to some degree generalizable to field behavior and it also helps understand the 
extent to which different individual preferences influence field behavior. The first two essays in 
this thesis apply this approach and provide evidence that there are indeed significant 
relationships between laboratory preference measures and field behavior and that the standard 
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assumption is too narrow for understanding field behavior. In particular, they show that 
cooperativeness (which captures other-regarding preferences) and impatience (time 
preferences) play an important role in field behavior. The third essay in this thesis uses 
laboratory experimentation and a classification procedure to test competing explanations for 
punishment behavior in the laboratory.  
 It has been observed in numerous laboratory experiments that some actors are cooperative 
in the presence of a conflict between private and collective interests. In public goods games, for 
instance, we observe that many subjects spend money to contribute to public goods (Andreoni, 
1995; Ledyard, 1995; Fehr and Gächter, 2000). It has also been observed that many actors are 
conditionally cooperative, i.e. they are cooperative, but only if they believe that other actors 
will cooperate as well (Fischbacher et al. 2001; Frey and Meier, 2004). These behavioral 
patterns in the laboratory appear to be robust to different subject pools and stake size 
(Cameron, 1999; Fehr et al., 2002; Fehr and Leibbrandt, 2008), and the findings give reason to 
believe that some actors have other-regarding preferences (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and 
Ockenfels, 2000; Charness and Rabin, 2002; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006).  
 There is also laboratory evidence that individuals have different time preferences and that 
many individuals are highly impatient (Benzion et al., 1989; Ashraf et al. 2006). Time 
preferences can have an important impact on behavior; for instance, it is likely that a wide 
range of empirically observable field behaviors, like low saving rates or high credit card take-
up (e.g. Laibson et al., forthcoming), are due to impatience. There are already empirical studies 
which combine laboratory time preference measures with field behavior, showing that time 
preferences are actually directly related to financial behavior (Meier and Sprenger, 2007). 
Moreover, time preferences seem important for cooperation. The more impatient individuals 
are, the less they invest in cooperation for future outcomes like the conservation of scarce 
resources. To date there are, however, no empirical studies showing the direct link between 
time preferences and cooperation in general or resource exploitation in particular. The first two 
essays in this dissertation close this gap and provide evidence how time preferences are related 
to cooperation in the field.  
 A different frequent laboratory finding is that many subjects incur costs to punish other 
subjects even if no future benefits can be expected from this behavior. This propensity to 
punish altruistically posses a challenge to the standard assumption of self-interested individuals 
and can be of interest when designing economic policies. In public goods games with a 
punishment stage, for instance, it can be observed that many subjects punish free-riders and that 
this punishment behavior helps sustain high contribution levels to public goods (Ostrom et al., 
1992; Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Masclet et al., 2003). Extrapolated to the field, this could imply 
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that some individuals are willing to punish uncooperative behavior and in this way enforce 
cooperation norms. However, the investigation of laboratory punishment behavior is still in its 
infancy and the motivations behind punishment are not perfectly understood. In particular, it is 
unclear whether individuals punish in an impartial and normative manner, or whether they do 
so egocentrically. Thus, before giving any recommendations for economic policies (for instance 
the facilitation of informal punishment among resource users), increased knowledge about the 
motivations behind punishment is crucial, as is an examination whether punishment promotes 
desirable outcomes and deters undesirable outcomes or if it instead hampers desirable 
outcomes.  
 The goal of this thesis is to improve our knowledge about the relevance of cooperativeness, 
impatience, and punishment for economic outcomes. The first essay, “Cooperativeness and 
Impatience in the Tragedy of the Commons”, examines the role of cooperativeness and 
impatience in the exploitation of common pool resources. In this study, we investigate 
fishermen whose main source of income stems from fishing grounds with open access. We 
combine laboratory measures of other-regarding and time preferences from the same fishermen 
with data about their fishing instruments. The findings show that fishermen who exhibit a 
higher propensity for cooperation in a laboratory public goods experiment, and those who show 
more patience in a laboratory time preference experiment, use fishing instruments which are 
less exploitative for the fishing grounds. We thus provide direct evidence that other-regarding 
preferences play an important role in crucial economic decisions in naturally occurring 
situations and establish other-regarding and time preferences as two distinct motivations for 
cooperation in the field to sustain CPRs.  
 The second essay, “How can the Behavioralist prevail in the Market? Performance on 
Naturally Occurring Markets and Individual Preferences”, studies the direct link between 
individual preferences and performance on naturally occurring markets where asymmetric 
information and reputation play an important role. This essay shows that other-regarding 
preferences are important for economic outcomes in markets because they can restrain 
impatient sellers from yielding to their temptation to engage in uncooperative behavior that 
leads to instant gratification but hampers market performance in the long-run. I find that 
impatient sellers who lack other-regarding preferences misrepresent quality more and achieve 
considerably lower prices for goods of similar quality compared to both patient sellers who lack 
other-regarding preferences and other-regarding sellers (regardless of their time preferences).  
 The third essay, “An Exploration of Third and Second Party Punishment in Ten Simple 
Games”, identifies the motives behind punishment from unaffected third parties and affected 
second parties using a within-subject design in ten simple games and a classification procedure. 
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We find that the most parsimonious model explaining the pattern of punishment includes 
inequity-averse and selfish subjects, and that this holds for both third and second parties. Our 
findings cast doubt on the idea that second and third parties punish in an impartial or normative 
manner.  
 The findings in the first essay corroborate the validity of social preference (Fehr and 
Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006) and reciprocity 
theories (Rabin, 1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Cox et al., 2007) for understanding 
persisting behavior in naturally occurring situations and show that there is no insurmountable 
gap between the laboratory and the field. With regard to economic policies, the findings 
suggest that one way to constrain overexploitation is by shifting the perception of the costs of 
current overexploitation into the present. Likewise, belief management and information policies 
which take the inherent bandwagon effects caused by preferences for conditional cooperation 
into account may be used for the management of CPRs. 
 The findings in the second essay point to an important role of other-regarding preferences 
for economic outcomes in naturally occurring markets and thus corroborate the validity of 
social preference and reciprocity theories for understanding market outcomes. I provide both 
theoretical and empirical evidence that other-regarding preferences can help impatient sellers 
from performance-damaging behavior. 
 The findings in the third essay have implications for the different social preference and 
reciprocity theories. Pure reciprocity models like Rabin (1993), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 
(2004), and Cox et al. (2007) fail to account for third party punishment and therefore should be 
not applied alone to explain punishment. Norm approaches (e.g. López-Pérez, 2008) face an 
unanticipated problem, as there seems to be no way to explain the punishment patterns as a 
reaction to a prior deviation from any sensible norm of distributive justice. In contrast, social 
preference models like Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Falk and Fischbacher (2006) fare much 
better in explaining third and second party punishment. We argue that economic policies should 
consider the endowment of third parties who serve in courts, as referees, or as arbitrators 
because it is likely that their judgment in these cases depends on their endowment, meaning 
that poorer parties sanction less impartially than richer parties. 
 This thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 presents the first essay “Cooperativeness and 
Impatience in the Tragedy of the Commons”. Thereafter, chapter 3 deals with the second essay 
“How can the Behavioralist prevail in the Market? Performance on Naturally Occurring 
Markets and Individual Preferences” and the last chapter 4 presents the third essay “An 
Exploration of Third and Second Party Punishment in Ten Simple Games”. 
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Chapter 2 
 
COOPERATIVENESS AND IMPATIENCE IN THE 
TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS  
 
 
 
Chapter Overview 
 
This paper examines the role of other-regarding and time preferences in the exploitation of 
common pool resources (CPRs) by combining laboratory experiments with field data. We study 
fishermen whose main, and often only, source of income stems from the use of fishing grounds 
with open access. The exploitation of a CPR involves a negative interpersonal and inter-
temporal externality because individuals who exploit the CPR reduce the current and the future 
yield for both others and themselves. Accordingly, economic theory predicts that more 
cooperative and less impatient individuals should be less likely to exploit the CPR. Our 
findings support this prediction because fishermen who exhibit a higher propensity for 
cooperation in a laboratory public goods experiment, and those who show more patience in a 
laboratory time preference experiment, use fishing instruments which are less exploitative of 
the fishing grounds. Thus, we provide direct evidence that other-regarding preferences play an 
important role in crucial economic decisions in naturally occurring situations and establish 
other-regarding and time preferences as two distinct motivations for cooperation in the field.  
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2.1 Introduction 
 
According to economic theory there is little cooperation in sustaining common pool resources 
(CPR) where individual and collective interests are in conflict. The standard assumption of pure 
self-interest implies that natural resources like fishing grounds or rain forests are overexploited, 
and that we are often trapped in an inevitable process that ends in the “Tragedy of the 
Commons” (Hardin, 1968). An additional aggravating factor for resource conservation is the 
propensity to discount future outcomes. The more impatient resource users are, the more they 
exploit natural resources.1 Interestingly, observations from the laboratory point a more 
optimistic picture regarding the occurrence of cooperation in social dilemmas. Considerable 
evidence now shows that some individuals cooperate voluntarily to sustain CPRs or public 
goods in the laboratory (Walker et al., 1990; Andreoni, 1995; Ledyard, 1995; Cardenas, 2000; 
Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Camerer, 2003; Casari and Plott, 2003; Croson, 2008; Charness and 
Villeval, forthcoming), suggesting that some individuals have other-regarding preferences 
(Andreoni, 1990; Rabin, 1993; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Charness 
and Rabin, 2002; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Sobel, 2005; Falk and Fischbacher, 
2006; Segal and Sobel, 2007). There is also laboratory evidence that individuals differ with 
regard to their degree of impatience (Benzion et al., 1989; Ashraf et al. 2006). 
 In view of the key role that economic theory assigns to individuals’ preferences in the 
exploitation of common natural resources, we study whether other-regarding and time 
preference measures predict fishermen’s propensity to exploit a CPR that constitutes their main, 
and often only, source of income. This is a nontrivial task because it requires laboratory 
preference measures and field data from the same fishermen. The problem is that field 
measures of preferences are often confounded by all sorts of factors – such as reputational 
incentives, budget or information constraints – while for laboratory preference measures it 
cannot be taken for granted that they predict people’s behavior outside the laboratory (Karlan, 
2005; Levitt and List, 2007). However, if it can be shown that laboratory measures of other-
regarding and time preferences are significantly predictive of fishermen’s behavior in the field 
we can kill two birds with one stone. First, we provide direct evidence that other-regarding 
preferences play an important role for crucial economic decisions in naturally occurring 
situations. Second, we identify with other-regarding and time preferences two distinct 
motivations for cooperation in the field to sustain CPRs.  
                                                 
1 Farzin (1984) shows that this statement holds as long as capital requirements for exploiting natural resources are 
low. If capital requirements are high, however, impatient individuals might shy away from investing in technology 
that facilitates the exploitation of natural resources and, thus, exploit natural resources less. In our setting, capital 
requirements are relatively low.  
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 We achieve these goals with the help of two unique data sets that both combine individual 
laboratory behavior with the individual decisions of fishermen pertaining to the use of certain 
fishing instruments. Our study takes place in Brazil and involves fishermen who live off shrimp 
or fish caught from a lake. As there is free access to the lake, they face a CPR dilemma in their 
daily lives. There is suggestive evidence that fishermen in this setting differ in their level of 
cooperation to sustain fishing grounds, i.e. they use different fishing instruments where the 
proportion of the catch consisting of small shrimp/fish which have not yet reached fertility 
varies (Cavalcanti, 2003). We have data from fishermen who catch shrimp (collected 2008) and 
fish (collected 2006) and both data sets include information about the harmfulness of their 
fishing instruments as well as their decisions in two laboratory experiments: a public goods 
experiment where free-riding is the dominant strategy, and a time preference experiment. If 
laboratory preference measures capture relevant aspects of preferences in the field, economic 
theories of other-regarding preferences predict that individuals who exhibit a higher propensity 
to cooperate in the laboratory public goods experiment (i.e. who demonstrate other-regarding 
preferences), and those who show more patience in the time preference experiment should use 
fishing instruments which exploit the CPR less for the following reasons: (i) a higher current 
exploitation reduces the current yield of other fishermen. Thus, ceteris paribus, other-regarding 
fishermen will impose fewer current negative externalities on others; and (ii) a higher current 
exploitation (in terms of small shrimp/ fish that have not yet reached fertility) also reduces the 
future yield for both others and themselves. Therefore, more other-regarding and less impatient 
individuals will impose fewer future negative externalities on others and themselves.2   
 Our data supports these predictions and shows that in both data sets laboratory other-
regarding and time preference measures are important predictors of individual behavior in real 
world CPRs. Fishermen who are more cooperative in the public goods experiments and those 
who are patient in the time preference experiments, use fishing instruments which are less 
exploitative of the fishing grounds. More cooperative and patient shrimp fishermen use shrimp 
traps with bigger holes where small and infertile shrimp can escape  (see Figure a in the 
appendix) and more cooperative and patient fishermen who catch fish use fishnets with larger 
mesh sizes in which only bigger fish are caught (see Figures b and c in the appendix). Note that 
the behavior in the laboratory public goods and time preference experiments is predicted to be 
independent because in the public goods experiment time preferences can play no role. We find 
indeed that fishermen who are impatient in the time preference experiments are neither more 
                                                 
2 In principle, it could be that other-regarding individuals will only impose fewer future negative externalities on 
others if they are patient, implying that there is an interaction effect between other-regarding preferences and 
patience. We checked for this possibility and do not find a significant interaction effect of other-regarding 
preferences and patience for CPR exploitation.    
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nor less likely to cooperate in the public goods experiments. Therefore, our study identifies that 
both other-regarding and time preferences independently influence cooperation in a naturally 
occurring field situation. In addition, we find that fishermen exploit fishing grounds less, (i) the 
less they believe that other fishermen exploit the fishing grounds and (ii) the higher they 
perceive the risk of the depletion of the fishing grounds.  
 While field behavior is sometimes explainable by other-regarding preferences, there is no 
direct evidence that other-regarding preferences actually play an important role for crucial 
economic decisions in naturally occurring situations. The existing field observations (e.g. 
Feeny et al., 1990; Sneath, 1998; Ostrom, 1999; Ostrom and Nagendra, 2006) cannot exclude 
the possibility that cooperation behavior in the field is driven by social pressure or reputation 
effects (Kandori, 1991; Bandeira et al., 2005; Mas and Moretti, forthcoming). Bandeira et al. 
(2005) find that fruit-pickers work less if their effort has negative externalities on their co-
workers but only on fruit fields where they can be monitored by their co-workers. Similarly, 
Mas and Moretti (forthcoming) find that cashiers work faster if they can be observed by a 
harder-working colleague but not if the harder-working colleague cannot observe their work 
speed. In addition, a field experiment by Landry et al. (2006) suggests that charitable donations 
are not necessarily a consequence of altruism or other-regarding preferences but are often 
motivated by status concerns or social pressure.  
 Falk (2007) observes that charitable donations can be increased when a gift is provided in a 
solicitation letter, indicating that there can be gift-exchange in the field. It remains unclear, 
however, whether this finding results from a unique and unrepeatable reaction to a positive 
surprise and whether gift-exchange is present in more competitive environments. In this regard, 
the study by Gneezy and List (2006) suggests that the positive effect of a gift vanishes quickly 
and the study by List (2006) observes that other-regarding behavior is not present in a 
competitive environment. One explanation to reconcile the previous findings is provided by 
Plott (1996) who proposes the “Discovered Preference Hypothesis”. In his view, people may be 
uncertain which behavior is in their best interest when they face new decisions and unfamiliar 
environments, and, therefore behave differently than when they make repeated decisions (for 
empirical evidence see Hoeffler and Ariely, 1999). An alternative explanation is that people 
have “constructed” and unstable preferences which depend on task and context, for instance 
people may be other-regarding in the context of donations but not in a different context (e.g. 
Slovic, 1995; Kahnemann, 1996).  
 Our study differs from earlier studies in that we combine both laboratory and field data 
from the same individuals to directly study the extent to which individual laboratory preference 
measures predict persisting individual field behavior in a competitive environment. This is an 
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important distinction because without laboratory preference measures from the same 
individuals there is no direct evidence that other-regarding behavior in the field comes from 
other-regarding preferences and that individuals have stable other-regarding preferences.  
 The first existing study combining laboratory cooperation behavior with field data from the 
same individuals is Karlan (2005).3 He conducted economic experiments with borrowers in a 
Peruvian microcredit program and reports that the behavior in a trust game predicts loan 
repayment. Individuals who transfer less money back to their trustor in a trust game are also 
more likely to drop out of the program due to defaults on their loans. This study shows that 
behavior in laboratory experiments can predict field behavior. However, since in his trust game 
trustors knew the identity of their trustees any back-transfer can be reconciled with selfishness 
in the presence of reputation effects and the role of other-regarding preferences therefore 
remains unclear in this study.4 Moreover, it is not clear whether defaults actually measure 
other-regarding behavior because loan repayment is not completely under the control of the 
borrower. For instance, it is possible that some borrowers were not able to repay their loans due 
to unfavorable situations which can happen to both selfish and cooperative individuals. In 
contrast, our experiments are played anonymously and our field measures of fishing 
instruments capture other-regarding behavior in a clear manner: Fishermen choose (and build) 
their fishing instruments and, therefore, the level of CPR exploitation lies in their own hands. 
 Our findings help to assess the importance of other-regarding preferences as well as the 
scope of social preference and reciprocity theories in naturally occurring situations. We show 
that there is no insurmountable gap between the laboratory and the field and that the 
meaningful relations between laboratory and field behavior corroborate economic models that 
assume stable preferences. In addition, our evidence that both other-regarding preferences and 
impatience are important for the exploitation of CPRs suggests ways in which the 
overexploitation of CPRs may be reduced. Economic policies, for example, which shift the 
perception of the costs of current overexploitation into the present are likely to constrain 
overexploitation. Likewise, belief management and information policies which take into 
                                                 
3 Benz and Meier (forthcoming) find a positive correlation between students’ donations in a laboratory experiment 
and their charitable donations to a student fund. Similarly, Laury and Taylor (2008) observe that the behavior in a 
public goods experiment can be informative for understanding donations to a non-profit environmental organization. 
They observe behavior during a laboratory experiment in which students could also donate money to an 
environmental organization. This contrasts with our study which predicts the fishermen’s cooperation behavior in the 
field in their professional activity – which constitutes their main source of income – with laboratory measures of 
other-regarding and time preferences.  
 
4 A similar argument also applies to the public goods game in Karlan (2005) which was also not played 
anonymously. In addition, it was a step level public good with many Nash equilibria, i.e., even purely selfish players 
had an incentive to contribute if they believed they were the pivotal players. 
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account the inherent bandwagon effects caused by preferences for conditional cooperation may 
be used for the management of CPRs.  
 The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 presents the field setting and the field data. 
Section 2.3 presents the laboratory experiments. Section 2.4 links the behavior of shrimp 
fishermen in the laboratory experiments with their field data. Section 2.5 provides a robustness 
check for our results in the previous section by linking the behavior of a different set of 
fishermen in the laboratory experiments with their field behavior.  Section 2.6 concludes.  
 
 
2.2 Field Setting and the Data  
 
2.2.1 Field Setting  
Our study took place at a lake in northeastern Brazil. Several rural fishing villages5 are situated 
around this lake where fishing is the main and often the only possible profession. Most 
fishermen catch shrimp and fish on their own, sell their catch at fish markets and thus provide 
their family with nutrition and income. There is free access to the fishing grounds (shrimp and 
fishing grounds), and a fisherman’s capital requirements are rather low. For catching shrimp, 
fishermen only need a small boat and shrimp traps which they manufacture from used PET 
bottles.6 While fishing, fishermen are typically scattered over the lake and fish at their 
preferred, sometimes remote spot(s). Other fishermen usually respect these spots, i.e. most 
fishermen do not fish at or close to another fisherman's spot. Their respect for others’ fishing 
spots means that the fishing ground at this lake is not a pure CPR, but shares some features of a 
private property. The fishermen are aware of the fact that overfishing has negative externalities 
on others but the private aspect of their fishing spots also means that private investments like 
refraining from catching small shrimp or fish affect their own chance to catch these same 
shrimp or fish at a larger size at the same spot in the future.  
 There are no legal constraints concerning the studied fishing instruments and there are no 
legal regulations concerning the catching of shrimp.7 In recent years, many fishermen have 
                                                 
5 We use the term "villages" for reasons of simplicity. In this field setting, these are sometimes not villages in the 
ordinary sense, but rather community agglomerations where the borders between the neighboring community 
agglomerations or villages are unclear.  
 
6 For catching fish, fishermen typically use a fishnet. The costs for a fishnet can be normally paid with the income 
generated from one week's catch.  
 
7 There is just one legal regulation concerning the catching of fish which is the prohibition of catching small fish 
(below 20–30 centimeters, depending on fish type). This regulation is, however, not enforced.  
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complained about decreasing catch rates, which they mostly blame on the overexploitation of 
the shrimp and fish resources, that is, the catching of large amounts of small and infertile 
shrimp and fish (Cavalcanti, 2003). A research project with fishermen revealed their strong 
concern about the excessive exploitation of shrimp resources in this field setting (Cavalcanti et 
al., 2008). Governmental and local university institutions have taken note of the severity of the 
situation and first steps have been initiated to help sustain the fishing grounds. A management 
council has been introduced which is examining the current fishing situation.  
 
2.2.2 Field Data 
In the following sections, we report the data from the fishermen who catch shrimp. The data for 
the fishermen who catch fish is presented briefly in the robustness check in section 2.5. A more 
detailed version can be found in our working paper (Fehr and Leibbrandt, 2008). We 
investigated the fishing instruments from 114 fishermen from March - May 2008 and have data 
from their behavior in laboratory experiments in April 2008.8 In addition, we conducted 
surveys in April 2008 where we collected socio-economic data and we measured cognitive 
skills in September 2008.  
 During the laboratory experiments and surveys, participants received a code to ensure 
anonymity and were free to leave at any point in time. The majority of our participants were 
male (73 percent), experienced and full-time fishermen (average years in profession was 17.4 
years and average weekly work time was 21.1 hours, not including the time spent for preparing 
and selling the shrimp) who generated their income mainly from fishing. 57 percent derived 
their income exclusively from fishing, 29.5 percent derived a small additional income from 
selling agricultural products and 16.1 percent also had a part-time job. On average, fishermen 
reported to have a monthly income of 302.4 Reais from all activities (variable: income).9 There 
were few differences in monetary wealth among our participants.10 Fishermen from this region 
were in general poor and owned few valuable things besides their cottage. Fishermen spent on 
average 3.4 years in school and lived in a household with 5.5 persons (variables: schooling and 
                                                 
8 We conducted eight experimental sessions in eight villages and the average session size was 26. Most of the 
experiments were run in local school buildings. We conducted experiments with in a total of 216 participants. In this 
paper, we report the behavior in a public goods and time preference experiment from participants where we know 
the average size of the shrimp traps (N=114). The full data set is available upon request.  
 
9 The Brazilian currency is called Real (singular) or Reais (plural). 1 Real equaled US $ 0.47 in September 2008, 
302.4 Reais = US $ 142.1. 
 
10 We asked participants how wealthy/poor they are compared to other fishermen. 92 percent responded that they are 
not considerably more/less wealthy than other fishermen.  
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household size). 95.4 percent of the fishermen used only modified PET bottles with small holes 
to catch shrimp.11 
 We investigate the cooperation behavior of fishermen in sustaining fishing grounds by the 
fishing instruments they use to catch shrimp.12 Investigating the fishing instruments has several 
advantages compared to other indices such as observing the catch quantity (or also the catch 
composition). First, by using fishing instruments as measures we have a robust picture of CPR 
exploitation and not just the snapshot that we would get when looking at catch rates/catch 
compositions for a limited period (fishermen may just have had a lucky/bad period and caught 
more/less than normally).13 Second, the intention to exploit CPRs by using a fishing instrument 
with certain characteristics is obvious whereas deducing such an intention from the catch 
quantity is problematic (catching a large quantity of shrimp for instance, can be perceived as a 
skill and not necessarily as an uncooperative act among fishermen).  
 Fishermen manufacture their shrimp traps from used PET bottles and make many holes in 
these traps, i.e. they decide themselves how big the holes will be. The smaller the holes in the 
traps, the more small and infertile shrimp are caught in the trap.14 Note that very small 
variations in the millimeter domain make a difference as to which shrimp are caught.15 From 
March - May 2008 we collected one to two bottles from each of 114 fishermen and measured 
five to ten holes in each bottle of the 0.1 centimeter level, to construct our variable hole size 
which captures the average size of the holes in shrimp traps from one fisherman. Figure 1 
shows the distribution of sizes fishermen use in our sample. The average hole size is 0.448 
centimeters. Half of our participants use shrimp traps with a hole size between 0.367 and 0.500 
centimeters, while 90 percent of the average hole size lies between 0.320 and 0.580 
centimeters. 
 
                                                 
11 The remaining 4.6 percent use two different shrimp traps at the same time (PET bottles and “bamboo baskets”). 
 
12 In an earlier version of this paper, we also looked at the composition of the shrimp catch and the relationship to 
laboratory measures of cooperativeness and impatience. The findings were in line with the results presented here. 
For further information consult our working paper (Fehr and Leibbrandt, 2008). 
 
13 Of course, one could also collect data on catch quantity/composition over an extended period. In practice, such 
data is typically not available, and, moreover it would need a huge effort (and therefore be inefficient) to collect such 
data. 
 
14 The hole size is positively related to self-reported catch size. We asked fishermen to estimate how many liter 
shrimp they catch in general during a good week and find that the larger the hole size the less many of liter 
fishermen report catching (Spearman Rank Correlation, r =-0.246, p=0.0077). Note that our catch size measure is 
self-reported, imprecise and also inappropriate to capture CPR exploitation. This contrasts with our hole size 
measure that is not self-reported, very precise and also appropriate (because it captures the extent to which fishermen 
catch very small shrimp); and therefore is better suited to measure CPR exploitation. 
 
15 The average size of caught shrimp is usually between two and three centimeters.  
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 We also collected survey data in 2008 regarding fishermen’s perception and belief about 
current CPR exploitation in their setting. The variable field perception measures how fishermen 
perceive the risk that the shrimp population will be depleted in the near future due to the use of 
PET bottles per se. The variable field belief measures the fishermen’s belief about the fraction 
of the other fishermen’s shrimp catch that is below two centimeters. Moreover, we measure 
how central fishermen live by asking how many people live in their close surroundings 
(variable: centrality, average: 24.5). In addition, we have data on the cognitive ability of shrimp 
fishermen. We measured cognitive ability by giving fishermen three questions of the form: 
Which option is better for you, selling 75 liter shrimp for 1.2 Reais or 130 liter for 0.75 Reais. 
Fishermen had to respond quickly and were rewarded with 1 Real if they answered all three 
questions correctly. Overall, 18.7 percent answered all three questions correctly (two correct 
answers: 52.7 percent, one correct answer: 26 percent, zero correct answers: 2.7 percent).  
 
 
2.3 The Laboratory Experiments  
 
2.3.1 The Public Goods Experiment  
Shrimp fishermen took part in an anonymous laboratory public goods experiment (PGE) with 
comparatively high monetary stakes (participants earned approximately 1.8 times their 
available daily income during the experimental sessions). The participants were divided into 
groups of three and played this experiment for one period. The payoff function was: 
( ) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +×+−=∏ ∑
≠
i
ij
jijii xxxxx 5.0)10(, . Each fisherman had to decide how many out of 
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ten monetary units (MUs) he contributed ( { }10,0∈ix ) to a public good.16 For each unit he 
contributed, he increased the monetary payoff of each of his group members j by 0.5 MUs, but 
at the same time, his own balance was reduced by 0.5 MUs. For each unit one of his group 
members decided to contribute, his own balance was increased by 0.5 MUs. Since the 
fishermen’s net return from contributing was negative, selfish fishermen should never 
contribute. However, if all four individuals in the group decided not to contribute, each of them 
only earned 10 MUs (10 – 0 + 0) compared to 15 MUs (0 + 0.5 × 10 × 3) if all of them 
contributed all ten MUs. The experiment was neutrally framed. Fishermen decided how many 
of the ten MUs they sent to a group account or otherwise kept in their private account. They 
were given two envelopes, one containing ten MUs and one containing 0 MUs. The participants 
could transfer MUs and then put both envelopes in a box. As the decision was made, the 
experimenter turned his back so that the fisherman was sure that the experimenter did not know 
his decision. After participants made their decisions, they were asked about their expectations 
of others' contributions. If they guessed the contribution of another participant correctly, they 
could win five MUs additionally. All rules were explained individually to the fishermen. No 
fisherman was informed about the identity of his group members.  
 Most fishermen do not behave according to the standard assumption but contribute to the 
public good (only 15.8 percent do not contribute and 11.4 percent contribute one MU). 21.1 
percent contribute five MUs and 18.4 percent contribute more than five MUs. Approximately 
half of the participants contribute no more than three MUs (58 out of 114) and we denote them 
low cooperative. The remaining 49.9 percent contribute at least four MUs and we denote them 
highly cooperative. In regression table a in the appendix, we observe that expectations about 
the contributions of the other group members are by far the most important variable for 
predicting the behavior in the PGE (t>5.09, p<0.0001); which supports earlier evidence that 
many individuals are conditionally cooperative (Fischbacher et al. 2001, Keser and van 
Winden, 2002; Frey and Meier, 2004; Shang and Croson, 2008). In addition, we find that 
several control variables are marginally significant. We observe that more experienced 
fishermen contribute more (t>1.97, p<0.052), that fishermen who work more hours per day 
contribute marginally less (t>1.83, p<0.071), that fishermen who live in larger households 
contribute less (t>1.95, p<0.055) and that fishermen who report a higher monthly income 
contribute more (t>1.88, p<0.064). We will control for these variables in the following 
regressions.  
                                                 
16 One MU always equaled one Real if the PGE was selected for payment. Participants only knew which experiment 
was actually paid out after they had played all experiments. The instructions for the laboratory experiments are in the 
appendix section A.1.1. 
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2.3.2 The Time Preference Experiment  
At the beginning of the experimental sessions in 2008, we implemented a time preference 
experiment (TPE) to obtain a measure for impatience. In this TPE, all fishermen had to indicate 
whether they preferred two pralines immediately or three pralines at the end of the 
experimental session when receiving their payment (on the same day). The pralines (“Sonho de 
Valsa”) are very popular among the fishermen; the vast majority (97 percent) liked the pralines. 
 We have data from this experiment for 83 of our 114 shrimp fishermen. 61.45 percent are 
patient and prefer to wait until the end of the experimental session to get three pralines whereas 
the remaining 38.55 percent are impatient and prefer to receive two pralines immediately. In 
column 2 of regression table a, we observe that none of the control variables significantly 
predicts the decision in the TPE. 
 
2.3.3 The Relation between Other-regarding Preferences and Impatience 
 in the Laboratory  
Other-regarding preferences and impatience might play an important role in explaining the 
individual degree of CPR exploitation in the field. The laboratory provides an opportunity for 
deriving distinct measures for both factors. We use our PGE to obtain an individual measure for 
cooperativeness and the TPE to obtain an individual measure for impatience. Because there are 
no inter-temporal spillovers in the PGE, measured impatience in the TPE should not predict 
cooperativeness in the laboratory. This prediction is confirmed by our data. Individuals who are 
impatient in the TPE are not more or less likely to contribute more MUs in the PGE (Fisher 
Exact Test, p=0.574). This is also true after controlling for covariates. In regression table a in 
the appendix in models 3 and 4, we observe that the impatience dummy is insignificant 
(p>0.310). Note that there is also no relation between the public goods and time preference 
experiment that we conducted in 2006 (p>0.820, see also Fehr and Leibbrandt, 2008).  
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2.4 Predicting Cooperation in the Field in sustaining CPR with      
  Laboratory Preference Measures 
 
The heart of this paper uses our laboratory preference measures to predict individual levels of 
CPR exploitation. We use the public goods and time preference experiment from 2008 to 
predict the average hole size in the shrimp traps of fishermen. We hypothesize that fishermen 
who contribute more in the PGE use fishing instruments that are less exploitative of the fishing 
grounds, and that fishermen who are impatient in the TPE use fishing instruments that are more 
exploitative of the fishing grounds.  
 
2.4.1 Other-regarding Preferences and Size of Holes in Shrimp Traps 
Figure 2 provides a first insight into the relationship between contributions in the PGE and the 
average hole size in the shrimp traps. The low cooperative fishermen (who contribute less than 
four MUs; N=58) use on average a hole size of 0.418 centimeters whereas the highly 
cooperative fishermen who contribute at least four MUs (N=56), use holes that are more than 
15 percent larger (0.484 centimeters). This difference is significant at any conventional level 
(t=-3.27, p=0.0014). The figure also shows the average hole size for fishermen who contribute 
one, two, three, four, five or six to ten MUs which is illustrated by the dots that are connected 
by a dashed line. It can be seen that the line is mostly increasing. The biggest difference exists 
between selfish fishermen who contribute zero (average is 0.409 centimeters, N=18) and 
fishermen who contribute five out of ten possible MUs (average is 0.494 centimeters, N=24). 
Fishermen who contribute between six and ten MUs use on average holes of 0.470 centimeters 
(N=21).  
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Figure 2: Cooperativeness and Holes in Shrimp Traps
note: standard error bands shown
 
  
 In regression table 1, we investigate whether this effect is robust in different specifications. 
Model (1) shows that without using controls, each MU contributed is associated with a 0.0105 
centimeters increase in average hole size (t=2.58, p=0.011) which means that a maximally 
cooperative fishermen uses on average 0.105 centimeter larger holes (i.e. approximately 25 
percent larger holes). Model (3) shows the effect after adding several controls. The effect is 
even more pronounced and highly significant (t=2.85, p=0.005). In model (4), we additionally 
control for impatience which does not affect our previous findings, i.e. cooperativeness is still 
highly significant (t=2.48, p=0.016). In model (5), we introduce village fixed effects to account 
for potential regional differences. The effect of cooperativeness is slightly less pronounced, but 
still highly significant (t=2.15, p=0.036). In model (6), we control for cognitive skills which 
further reduces the sample size. Nevertheless, the effect of cooperativeness is strong and robust 
(t=2.05, p=0.046) and we can see that cognitive skills are completely uninformative for hole 
size (t=-0.24, p=0.815). Also when looking at the pure correlation between cognitive skills and 
hole size, we find no relationship (Spearman Rank Correlation, r=-0.01, p=0.926), i.e. cognitive 
skills as measured by calculation abilities are completely unrelated to hole size.  
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TABLE 1―DETERMINANTS OF SIZE OF HOLES IN SHRIMP TRAPS        
(OLS)   
Dependent Variable Average Size of Holes in Shrimp Trap in cm 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
0.0105**  0.0106*** 0.0104** 0.0088** 0.0093** Contribution in PGE 
(0.0041)  (0.0037) (0.0042) (0.0041) (0.0046) 
 –0.0504**  –0.0544** –0.0475** –0.0566* Impatience                        
(Praline Dummy)  (0.0230)  (0.0242) (0.0229) (0.0300) 
  0.0000 0.0011 0.0005 0.0080 Belief in PGE 
  (0.0045) (0.0051) (0.0050) (0.0067) 
   –0.1658 –0.1352  Impatience: likes praline?  
   (0.1621) (0.1479)  
  0.0006 0.0013 0.0004 0.0022 Age 
  (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0014) 
  0.0927*** 0.0568** 0.0415 0.0287 Gender (Male Dummy) 
  (0.0227) (0.0236) (0.0325) (0.0349) 
  0.0070* 0.0059 0.0049 0.0066* Household Size 
  (0.0036) (0.0040) (0.0041) (0.0036) 
  –0.0004 –0.0005 –0.0007* –0.0004 Centrality 
  (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) 
  –0.0063* –0.0007 –0.0027 –0.0035 Schooling 
  (0.0035) (0.0047) (0.0046) (0.0046) 
  –0.0012 –0.0023** –0.0021* –0.0031** Years in Profession 
  (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0014) 
  –0.0139 –0.0278** –0.0233 –0.0412** Field Belief 
  (0.0110) (0.0138) (0.0148) (0.0170) 
  0.0307*** 0.0199** 0.0167* 0.0081 Field Perception 
  (0.0095) (0.0097) (0.0098) (0.0136) 
  0.0058 0.0086 0.0040 0.0065 Hours Fishing 
  (0.0067) (0.0061) (0.0063) (0.0087) 
  –0.0001** –0.0001 –0.0000 –0.0000 Quantity of Shrimp Traps 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
  –0.0000 –0.0000 –0.0000 –0.0000 Income 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
     –0.0035 Cognitive Skills 
     (0.0150) 
0.4122*** 0.4061*** 0.2102** 0.4387** 0.4743** 0.4008*** Constant 
(0.0174) (0.0164) (0.0813) (0.1860) (0.1909) (0.1126) 
Village Fixed Effects? no no no no yes yes 
Observations 114 83 113 83 83 66 
R2 0.064 0.051 0.322 0.377 0.450 0.494 
 Notes: *** 99-percent significance, ** 95-percent significance; * 90-percent significance. Robust Standard 
Errors in Parentheses.  
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2.4.2 Impatience and Size of Holes in Shrimp Traps 
Figure 3 illustrates that fishermen who are impatient in the TPE and prefer two pralines 
immediately over three pralines at the end of the experimental session use smaller holes in their 
shrimp traps than patient fishermen. The average hole size for impatient fishermen is 0.406 
centimeters whereas patient fishermen who prefer three pralines at the end of the experimental 
session use holes that are on average 0.457 centimeters, i.e. approximately 12 percent larger 
(t=-2.09, p=0.0396, two-sided).   
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Figure 3: Impatience and Holes in Shrimp Traps
note: standard error bands shown  
 
 This difference in the size of the holes in the shrimp traps is robust as we can see in the 
models 2, 4-6 in regression table 2. In model (2), we can see the pure effect after controlling for 
whether the fishermen like the pralines. A patient fishermen has on average 0.05 centimeter 
larger holes (t=2.19, p=0.031). In model (4), we use our standard control variables which does 
not change the significance of the impatience dummy (coefficient=0.054 centimeter, t=2.25, 
p=0.028). Impatience remains also significant at the 5 percent level after controlling for village 
fixed effects (model 5). In model (6) with the smaller sample, the impatience dummy is 
significant at p=0.065. None of the other variables besides cooperativeness and impatience are 
significantly predictive of hole size in all models. There are, however, some variables which 
seem to play an important role for hole size. Field perception predicts hole size in all models 
besides model 6, which may be due to the smaller sample size in this model. Fishermen who 
perceive a higher risk that the shrimp population will be depleted in the near future tend to use 
larger holes in their shrimp traps. The variable field belief is significant in models 4 and 6, and 
marginally insignificant in models 3 and 5. Fishermen who believe that other fishermen catch a 
larger fraction of small shrimp use smaller holes, suggesting that fishermen are also 
conditionally (un-) cooperative in the field. Male fishermen tend to use larger holes but this 
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effect becomes insignificant after controlling for village fixed effects. Experience as a 
fisherman is negatively related to hole size, but this effect seems to be partly explainable by 
multicollinearity between experience and age. When we drop age in the regression, the effect of 
experience gets weaker and becomes insignificant or is only marginally significant. Household 
size is marginally positively related to hole size, suggesting that fishermen with more children 
are more concerned about sustainable fishing. The quantity of shrimp traps is significantly 
predictive of hole size in model 3 which shows that fishermen who use larger holes also use 
less shrimp traps.  
 
 
2.5 Robustness Check 
 
In 2006, we investigated the cooperation behavior of fishermen in sustaining fishing grounds 
(Fehr and Leibbrandt, 2008). Most fishermen use the fishnet as the fishing instrument as their 
fishing instrument of choice to catch fish. The fishnets differ according to their mesh size and 
the smaller the mesh size of the fishnet, the more infertile fish are caught in the fishnet.17 We 
hypothesized that more cooperative fishermen use fishnets with larger mesh sizes and impatient 
fishermen use smaller mesh sizes. 
 
2.5.1 The 2006 Field and Laboratory Data 
We collected data on the mesh sizes of the fishnets from two sources: survey responses in 2006 
and field observations in 2008. While re-visiting the fishermen in 2008, we investigated the 
fishnets of approximately every third fisherman who participated in 2006 and who used a 
fishnet (35 out of 121).18 We find that the two year old survey responses are very much in line 
with the recent field data (Spearman Rank Correlation, r=0.70; p<0.0001). Figure d in the 
                                                 
17 Note that fishnets differ according to their mesh size. However, the price of the fishnet is in this setting 
independent of the mesh size. Fishnets with smaller mesh sizes are not more expensive than fishnets with bigger 
mesh sizes. In case fishermen possessed more than one fishnet, the variable mesh size specifies the mesh size of the 
fishnet that is used most frequently. Using a fishnet with a larger mesh size can lead to an income reduction of 
approximately eight percent. We asked fishermen to fill out a daily report for several weeks where they reported 
which mesh size they used, the amount of fish they caught, and the weight in kilograms of fish they caught. Nine 
fishermen reported frequently using two different mesh sizes. When they use the smaller mesh size, they report 
catching a 21.5 percent larger number of fish per hour (p < 0.01) and 16 percent more kilograms of fish per hour (p = 
0.07). If we assume that the additional fish caught with a small mesh size are all small fish that are sold at a 50 
percent lower price (e.g., instead of a normalized price of 1 for larger fish the small fish are sold at a price of 0.5), 
the fishermen who use a small mesh size earn roughly 8 percent (0.16 x 0.5) more income per hour. A 50 percent 
lower price for small fish is a realistic assumption.  
 
18 Typically, we went to their houses or to the lake and asked them to show us their fishnet. 
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appendix illustrates the relation between the survey data and the field observations. Almost 
two-thirds of the fishermen use a mesh size that is smaller than five centimeters, with a mean of 
4.42 centimeters. The most frequently used mesh sizes are 3.5, 5, and 6 centimeters. Figure e in 
the appendix shows in detail the mesh sizes fishermen use in our sample. 
 The fishermen also took part in an anonymously played laboratory public goods and time 
preference experiment (PGE 06 and TPE 06).19 In the PGE 06, fishermen had to decide how 
many out of seven MUs they contributed to a public good in each of five different periods. The 
group size was four and stable during all periods. Because the fishermen’s net return from 
contributing was negative, never contributing was always in their material interest if the 
selfishness and rationality of all individuals was common knowledge. The more cooperative the 
fishermen are, however, the more they should contribute. 87 percent contributed in the first 
period and almost half of the fishermen contributed between three and five units. In the 
remaining four periods, contributions declined continuously.  
 In the TPE 06, fishermen had to indicate whether they prefer one bottle of mineral water 
immediately or two bottles the next day. If they preferred the good immediately, the fishermen 
received the good immediately after the experiment. If they preferred two units of the good the 
next day, we distributed vouchers with which they could collect their good the next day at the 
village leader's house. The village leader was elected by the residents and is usually considered 
an extraordinarily trustworthy person.20 We observe that 59.6 percent were impatient and 
preferred one bottle of mineral water immediately. As in our PGE 08 and TPE 08, we find no 
significant relationship between cooperativeness and impatience in the PGE 06 and TPE 06. 
 
2.5.2  Cooperativeness, Impatience, and Fishnet Mesh Size  
Figure 4 illustrates that there is a positive relationship between behavior in the PGE 06 and the 
mesh size. For instance, if we divide the fishermen into two equally sized groups according to 
their contributions in the first period of the PGE, we observe that those who are less 
cooperative and who contribute less than five MUs (N=61) use on average a mesh size of 4.03 
                                                 
19 The instructions are in appendix A.1.2. 
 
20 In practice, the participating fishermen were not concerned about not receiving their good (the next day). 
Nevertheless, before individuals made their choice in the TPE, we assured them that they would receive their good. 
We also asked many participants if they were concerned about not receiving their good – which was not the case. 
The experimenters were also not strangers to the participants. At least one of the experimenters was known to the 
community leader before the experiments (who had her/his contact details) and to other fishermen. Participating 
fishermen also had the possibility to see how the experimenters gave the community leaders the mineral water for 
handing out the next day.  After the experiments we got in contact with the community leader to ask whether all 
participants collected their goods – which was the case. When we re-visited the participants, none complained about 
not receiving her/his good. 
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centimeters (the mode is 3.5 centimeters, N=25) whereas those who are more cooperative and 
contribute at least five MUs (N=62) use on average a mesh size of 4.73 centimeters (the modes 
are 5 and 6 centimeters, each N=15). This difference is significant at any conventional level (T-
test, t=-3.891, p=0.0002) and substantial.21 The figure shows also the average mesh size for 
fishermen who contribute one, two …, seven MUs, which is illustrated by the dots that are 
connected by a dashed line. We can see that the line is increasing to the right and that the 
biggest difference exists between selfish fishermen who contribute zero (the average is 3.81 
centimeters) and fishermen who contribute six out of seven possible MUs (the average is 5.15 
centimeters).   
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Figure 4: Cooperativeness & Fishnet Mesh Size
  
 In regression table 2 we use three OLS models to predict the mesh size. In model (1), we 
use the behavior in our two laboratory experiments as independent variables and control for 
several socio-economic and fishing related measures. In model (2), we control in addition for 
village fixed effects. We find that in both models, contributions in the first period of the PGE 
06 are positively related to the mesh size of the fishnet. Each MU contributed in the first period 
of the PGE is associated with a 0.145/0.133 centimeter larger mesh size (t > 2.72, p < 0.008). In 
model (3), we use only the small sub-sample of 35 fishermen where we observed the fishnets 
and we control for the significant covariates from models 2 and 3. We still find a marginally 
significant relationship for cooperativeness (t=1.80, p=0.083). We also find a negative effect 
                                                 
21 While it is difficult to find an exact correlation between a difference of one centimeter in mesh size with respect to 
the size of fish ultimately caught (since this does depend on the fish type), the fishermen estimate this to be 
approximately 3–7 centimeters. Note as a rough reference point that small fish that are below the legal minimum size 
(20–30 centimeters depending on fish type) are frequently caught in fishnets with mesh sizes that are smaller than 
five centimeters.  
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with regards to impatience in models 1 and 2. Fishermen who are impatient and prefer one 
bottle of mineral water immediately use 0.345/0.366 centimeter smaller mesh sizes (t < 1.81, p 
< 0.073) and this result even holds in the small sub-sample in model 3 (t=1.86, p=0.074).  
 In addition we find that the variable field perception plays an important role in all models. 
Fishermen who already perceive a relatively large mesh size as harmful tend to use larger mesh 
sizes. And we find that the variable field belief is significant in all models. It turns out that the 
more pessimistic a fisherman is about the exploitation level of the other fishermen, the more 
likely he is to use a small mesh size.  
 
 
TABLE 2―DETERMINANTS OF FISHNET MESH SIZE    
(OLS)  
Dependent Variable Frequently Used Mesh Size of Fishnet in cm 
Model (1) (2) (3) 
    
0.145*** 0.133*** 0.171* Contribution in First Period 
of PGE (0.043) (0.049) (0.095) 
–0.345* –0.366** –0.641* Impatience                        
(Mineral Water Dummy) (0.190) (0.184) (0.345) 
–0.011 -0.000  Age 
(0.012) (0.013)  
–0.326 –0.732*  Gender (Female Dummy) 
(0.335) (0.374)  
0.036 0.023  Family Size 
(0.033) (0.037)  
–0.012 –0.010  Schooling 
(0.032) (0.033)  
0.010 0.007  Years in Profession 
(0.010) (0.010)  
0.178** 0.182** 0.503** Field Belief 
(0.079) (0.073) (0.244) 
0.160*** 0.156*** 0.352** Field Perception 
(0.055) (0.056) (0.132) 
-0.005 0.009 -0.144 Belief in first Period of PGE 
(0.053) (0.059) (0.141) 
–0.006 –0.006  Hours Fishing 
(0.007) (0.006)  
3.022*** 2.784*** 2.023** Constant 
(0.526) (0.664) (0.985) 
Village Fixed Effects? no yes no 
Observations 121 121 35 
R2 0.256 0.334 0.227 
 Notes: *** 99-percent significance, ** 95-percent significance; * 90-percent 
significance. Robust Standard Errors in Parantheses.  
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2.6 Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we show that other-regarding preferences play an important role for crucial 
economic decisions in naturally occurring situations. We find in two different data sets that, 
fishermen who behave more prosocially in a public goods experiment use fishing instruments 
that exploit the fishing grounds less. At the same time, we show that time preferences play an 
additional role for cooperation in the field to sustain CPRs and show in both data sets that 
fishermen who are impatient in a time preference experiment use fishing instruments that 
exploit the fishing grounds more. If only field or laboratory data were available, we could not 
uncover these relationships but the combination of the two allowed us to identify two different 
individual preferences that are both related to important cooperation decisions outside the 
laboratory.  
 Our results may have important implications for policymakers, managers, and social 
scientists. They provide empirical evidence that when designing policy measures it is useful to 
account for impatience as it is an obstacle for the implementation of resource preserving 
policies. Likewise, it may be useful to know about the conditional nature of fishermen’s 
cooperativeness, i.e., their conditional willingness to cooperate in concrete situations even if 
cooperation goes against their immediate self-interest. Thaler and Benartzi (2004) designed the 
Smart commitment mechanism which helped impatient employees who lack self-control 
increase their future savings. We imagine a similar mechanism for promoting resource 
conservation which incorporates both the propensity to discount future outcomes as well as the 
propensity to cooperate voluntarily (if others cooperate as well). Individuals can be approached 
to commit in advance to change their behavior towards a more sustainable use of resources, but 
this commitment only becomes binding if a specified majority of the other resource users also 
commits. For example, the fishermen could commit (e.g., by signing a contract with an 
environmental agency) to exchange their fishnets with small mesh size to fishnets with bigger 
mesh size in the future if a specified majority of the other fishermen is also willing to commit 
to this policy. This proposal takes advantage of the conditional nature of fishermen’s 
willingness to cooperate and, in addition, it reduces the perception of the cost of cooperation by 
shifting the exchange of the fishnets into the future. Thus, impatient individuals who lack self-
control and conditionally cooperative individuals are more likely to commit to this policy than 
to an alternative policy that requires unconditional cooperation and imposes the cost of 
cooperation in the current period. Similar mechanisms can be applied to other settings as well. 
For example, policymakers could ask commuters in metropolitan areas to commit to buy a one-
month ticket for public transportation for the following year as soon as a sufficient number of 
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commuters is also willing to keep this commitment. Such a mechanism, which accounts for 
conditional cooperativeness and impatience, could discourage environmental unfriendly 
behavior and help sustaining natural resources.  
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2.A  Appendix Tables and Figures 
 
 
TABLE a―DETERMINANTS OF LABORATORY BEHAVIOR          
(OLS, Probit) 
          
Dependent Variable Cooperativeness (OLS) 
Patience 
(Probit) 
Cooperativeness 
(OLS) 
Cooperativeness 
(OLS) 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  0.386 0.539 Patience Dummy 
(Praline)   (0.587) (0.527) 
0.600***   0.564*** Belief in PGE 
(0.094)   (0.111) 
 0.256  -0.046 Impatience: likes 
praline?                          (0.391)  (1.527) 
-0.037 -0.005  -0.035 Age 
(0.028) (0.007)  (0.038) 
0.204 0.040  0.019 Gender (Male Dummy) 
(0.412) (0.138)  (0.544) 
-0.143** -0.012  -0.173* Household Size 
(0.065) (0.021)  (0.089) 
-0.010 0.002  -0.008 Centrality 
(0.006) (0.002)  (0.006) 
0.056 -0.023  0.139 Schooling 
(0.113) (0.024)  (0.146) 
0.050* -0.002  0.066** Years in Profession 
(0.026) (0.007)  (0.029) 
-0.243 0.061  -0.206 Field Belief 
(0.279) (0.071)  (0.272) 
-0.100 0.026  -0.113 Field Perception 
(0.240) (0.060)  (0.262) 
-0.254* -0.009  -0.349** Hours Fishing 
(0.139) (0.037)  (0.162) 
0.002** 0.000  0.002* Income 
(0.001) (0.000)  (0.001) 
Observations 113 83 83 83 
R2 0.412  0.005 0.398 
Pseudo R2  0.055   
 Notes: *** 99-percent significance, ** 95-percent significance; * 90-percent significance. Robust 
Standard Errors in Parantheses.  
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Figure a: Shrimp Trap made of PET bottle 
 
Note: Shrimp enter through big hole in front and can only  
escape through small holes at the bottom of the bottle. 
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Figure b: Fishnet from one Fisherman 
 
 
 
Figure c: Measuring the Fishnet Mesh Size 
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Chapter 3 
 
HOW CAN THE BEHAVIORALIST PREVAIL IN THE 
MARKET? PERFORMANCE ON NATURALLY 
OCCURRING MARKETS AND INDIVIDUAL 
PREFERENCES 
 
 
 
Chapter Overview 
 
This paper experimentally studies the direct link between individual preferences and 
performance in naturally occurring markets where asymmetric information and reputation play 
an important role. Overall, I find that less cooperative sellers underperform compared to more 
cooperative sellers and achieve considerably lower prices for goods of similar quality. The 
overall finding is mediated by impatient less cooperative sellers who also misrepresent quality 
more than more cooperative sellers (patient and impatient) as well as patient less cooperative 
sellers. This shows that other-regarding preferences are important for economic outcomes 
because they can restrain impatient sellers from yielding to their temptation for instant 
gratification and thus prevent them from handicapping their market performance. Moreover, 
this paper provides new field evidence that the degree of risk-aversion is negatively related to 
market performance.  
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3.1 Introduction 
 
Numerous laboratory experiments provide evidence that there are cooperative individuals 
(Roth, 1995; Camerer and Thaler, 1995; Camerer, 2003) and that the cooperativeness of some 
individuals results in more efficient outcomes in moral hazard contexts than the standard self-
interest model assumes (Fehr et al, 1993; Brown et al., 2004; Fehr et al., 2007). These findings 
led to the formulation of theories of other-regarding preferences which provide several 
explanations for cooperativeness based on non-monetary motivations (Andreoni, 1990; Rabin, 
1993; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Charness and Rabin, 2002; 
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Sobel, 2005 and 2007; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006; Cox et 
al., 2007; López-Pérez, 2008). However, it is still unclear how more cooperative individuals 
can prevail in markets and keep up with less cooperative individuals who are more likely to 
engage in uncooperative behavior whenever it is in their own monetary interest and therefore 
should tend to outperform more cooperative individuals.  
 In this paper, I investigate the behavior and performance of sellers with different individual 
preferences in naturally occurring markets. I present a simple model which predicts that other-
regarding preferences are beneficial for market performance because they can restrain impatient 
sellers from yielding to their temptation to engage in uncooperative behavior that leads to 
instant gratification but hampers their market performance in the long-run. To verify this 
prediction and to identify the links between individual preferences, behavior, and performance 
in the field, the present study uses a unique data set that combines individual field and 
laboratory data from the same individuals. The studied individuals are fishermen who derive 
their income from selling shrimp at markets where asymmetric information about the quality of 
the shrimp – and reputation in general – play an important role. The data comprises information 
about the trades at these markets like achieved prices and offered quality, quality 
misrepresentations, and laboratory measures of the sellers' other-regarding, time and risk 
preferences.  
 I find that other-regarding preferences are indeed beneficial for impatient sellers and 
restrain them from misrepresenting quality and thus hampering their market performance. 
Impatient, less cooperative sellers (i.e. those who are self-interested or who have few 
pronounced other-regarding preferences) are more likely to misrepresent quality than either 
patient, less cooperative sellers or more cooperative sellers, regardless of their patience. 
Whereas, more cooperative sellers outperform less cooperative sellers overall and achieve 
significantly and considerably higher selling prices for shrimp of similar quality, the data 
reveals that time preferences mediate the performance difference between more and less 
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cooperative sellers. Only impatient, less cooperative sellers underperform in comparison to 
patient, less cooperative and more cooperative sellers in general. In addition, I find that more 
risk-averse sellers underperform and achieve significantly lower selling prices for shrimp of 
similar quality compared to less risk-averse sellers. Interestingly, sellers who are less exposed 
to markets are endowed with similar preferences compared to sellers who are more exposed, 
suggesting that individual preferences affect market outcomes (and not vice versa).  
 This paper shows that other-regarding preferences play an important role in economic 
outcomes in naturally occurring markets and thus corroborate social preference and reciprocity 
theories. Importantly, it provides both theoretical and empirical evidence that more cooperative 
sellers can have competitive advantages compared to impatient, less cooperative sellers. 
Therefore, the data also refute the conventional wisdom claiming that markets make sellers 
selfish and challenges recent studies questioning the presence of other-regarding preferences in 
markets (e.g. List, 2006). To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first to investigate the 
relationship between combinations of different individuals' preferences, behavior, and 
performance in naturally occurring markets.  
 Few studies consider the importance of individual preferences for performance in naturally 
occurring markets. The findings in my paper are supported by survey evidence drawn from 
large and representative sample sizes (Bonin et al., 2007; Dohmen et al., forthcoming). Bonin et 
al. (2007) find that individuals who report having a lower propensity to take risks are more 
likely to work in occupations with lower wages. Dohmen et al. (forthcoming) provide evidence 
on the relationship between inclinations to reciprocate and labor market outcomes. They find 
that individuals who are more likely to respond to questions like “If someone does me a favor, I 
am prepared to return it” with “applies to me perfectly” also report to working harder and 
having higher incomes.22 In contrast, the present study uses behavioral preferences measures, 
actual instead of reported field behavior and outcomes, and, in addition, provides an 
explanation for the overall finding that more cooperative (i.e. more reciprocal) individuals can 
generate higher incomes.  
 The paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 presents the field setting and the field and 
laboratory data. In section 3.3, I present a model to derive predictions for the market behavior 
and performance of the different seller types. Sections 3.4 to 3.6 present the empirical data. 
Section 3.4 presents how other-regarding and time preferences are linked to quality 
misrepresentation. Section 3.5 investigates the relationships between other-regarding, time and 
                                                 
22 A possible objection could be that it is likely that their survey questions not only capture inclinations to 
reciprocate, but other aspects, such as social desirability concerns. And it seems plausible that individuals who care 
more about social desirability (and therefore appear more positive reciprocal) are more successful at the labor 
market. 
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risk preferences and market performance. Section 3.6 presents whether different levels of 
market exposure affect individual preferences. Section 3.7 concludes.  
 
 
3.2 Field Setting and the Data  
 
3.2.1 Field Setting  
The study took place in Brazil, using shrimp fishermen who live by selling their catch. In this 
setting, fishing is the main and often the only possible profession for generating income. There 
is free access to the fishing grounds and capital requirements for becoming a fisherman are low: 
only a small boat and shrimp traps that are made of used PET bottles are needed. Most 
fishermen sell their catch at markets and in this way cover their living expenses. In the study 
region, there is one big and several small markets where fishermen sell their shrimp once a 
week. Typically, they are able to sell their whole catch (which is often more than 100 liters) 
quickly; most of their catch is bought by one or several middlemen, who then resell it to bars 
and restaurants. Figure a in the appendix illustrates the shrimp market. Reputation plays a 
crucial role, as long-term trade relations between sellers and buyers are common.  
 The shrimp markets constitute an ideal field setting for studying market performance. First, 
the traded shrimp differ only in one important quality dimension, which is average shrimp 
size.23 Bigger shrimp are tastier, and are sold for significantly higher prices per liter than 
smaller shrimp. Second, there is considerable variance in selling prices among the different 
sellers, even after controlling for shrimp size. This implies that some sellers achieve higher 
selling prices for similar shrimp, i.e. there are considerable differences in market performance.  
 There is asymmetric information about the precise size of the traded shrimp. The shrimp are 
presented in large piles and the bigger shrimp are often placed on top. A buyer cannot easily 
verify the average shrimp size from one seller on a particular day, unless he puts a large effort 
in scanning the piles, which the sellers typically do not appreciate.24 Therefore, it can be 
                                                 
23 Shrimp also differ in color because some fishermen color their shrimp red to make them look tastier. I control for 
color in some regressions but find no significant effect. Note that there are no visible differences in the shrimp type 
(there are two shrimp types which are extremely similar) and that freshness plays no important role because the 
shrimp are sold dried. 
 
24 Note that the average size of the shrimp differs from week to week, i.e., even if buyers measured the exact size in 
a certain week (after buying them), they would not know the exact size in a different week. Although sellers have 
some influence on the average shrimp size (as this depends on the holes in their shrimp traps), other factors not 
under control of the fishermen, like season or luck, also influence average shrimp size. I collected data on the 
average shrimp size over consecutive weeks from 24 sellers. Figure b in the appendix shows the average shrimp size 
of buyers in two different weeks. As expected there is a significant correlation of average shrimp size across weeks 
(Spearman Rank Correlation, r=0.493, p=0.014), but considerable variance as well. 
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beneficial for buyers to rely on the sellers' quality estimate if buyers believe the seller is 
trustworthy and reports quality truthfully. 
 
 
3.2.2 Field Data 
The field data comes from observations of actual trades on shrimp markets and from two 
different surveys. The field data about the trades was collected within a three week horizon in 
April-May 2008; the surveys were conducted individually in village meetings in April and 
August 2008. In total, there is field data from 99 fishermen which contain the selling price per 
liter shrimp, the average shrimp size, the quantity sold in liters, and the color of the shrimp. I 
use the selling price per liter shrimp as a measure for market performance because it is the most 
direct measure, and unlike other measures (e.g. income), it depends less on other imperfectly 
observable factors.25 The data was typically collected at the moment the trades were 
concluded.26 We also collected one liter of the sold shrimp from the bottom of the piles to 
identify the representative average size and color of the shrimp. We calculated the average size 
by averaging the size of 30 different shrimp to provide a reliable measure. We took the shrimp 
from the bottom because some fishermen put the bigger shrimp on top of the piles to 
misrepresent quality, i.e. to give the impression that the average shrimp size is bigger.  
 In addition, we collected two samples of shrimp, one from the bottom and one from the top 
of the pile, from 33 fishermen. It turns out that in 25 of the 33 samples, the average shrimp size 
is larger in the sample on the top. On average, the sample from the top contains shrimp that are 
7.32 percent larger (one sample T-test, t=3.12, p<0.004 that mean equals zero). I use the 
percentage difference between the two samples as a measure for misrepresenting quality. 
Figure 1 presents the differences between top and bottom shrimp in more detail. On the right 
side of the vertical line, we can see the distributions of quality misrepresentations where sellers 
have larger shrimp on top of the piles.   
                                                                                                                                              
 
25 For instance, price per liter shrimp in our sample does not significantly depend on operating expenses (like hours 
fishing) or the quantity of shrimp sold, i.e. there are no quantity discounts. This means that sellers who achieve a 
higher price per liter shrimp can also achieve a higher income. Note, however, that sellers who achieve a higher price 
per liter shrimp do not necessarily have a higher income. For instance, these sellers might spend less time on the lake 
and catch fewer shrimp because they are income targeting (for evidence on income targeting see Fehr and Götte, 
2008, for example).   
 
26 The experimenters stayed at the market and asked the fishermen in advance for their permission to do so. We 
ensured fishermen that nobody besides the experimenter will be able to retrace the individual terms of the trades.  
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Figure 1: Quality Misrepresentation
 
 Approximately 60 percent of the field data comes from the biggest market in the region, and 
the remaining observations come from three smaller markets. On average, the selling price per 
liter is 1.27 Reais27. The average shrimp size is 2.97 centimeters (50 percent lie between 2.74 
and 3.23 centimeters). 44 out of 99 fishermen color their shrimp. The distributions for the 
selling prices and average shrimp sizes are presented in Figures c and d in the appendix. Figure 
e in the appendix illustrates that there is a significant positive relationship between selling 
prices and average shrimp sizes across all markets (Spearman Rank Correlation, r=0.320, 
p=0.001), and that the selling price increases on average by 0.386 Reais for each additional 
centimeter in average shrimp size. Table a in the appendix provides a summary statistic for the 
field data. 
 To test the existence of asymmetric information, buyers and sellers took part in a “guessing 
game”, where the most accurate guess about the average shrimp size in a pile was rewarded 
with a high monetary reward.28 It turned out that while buyers considerably overestimated the 
average size (by 0.437 centimeters) of shrimp of a seller from whom they frequently buy, 
sellers where much more accurate in guessing the average shrimp size of their own catch 
(+0.286 centimeters; Variance Comparison Test, p=0.013, two-sided), providing evidence for 
the persistence of asymmetric information in this setting.  
    In April 2008, a total of 216 fishermen took part in a survey, including the 99 fishermen for 
whom I collected the field data. The survey was conducted individually at meetings and 
                                                 
27 1 Real (pl. Reais) equaled approximately 0.60 US Dollars during the observation period.  
 
28 The guessing game took place twice at a big shrimp market. The best guess was rewarded with 100 respectively 
50 Reais, which is approximately a one (half)-week income of a shrimp seller. In total, 25 sellers and 12 middlemen 
took part in the guessing game.  
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included questions about the socio-demographic characteristics of the fishermen. The typical 
fisherman is experienced and has already been fishing for 17.7 years. Fishermen sell their 
shrimp to friends, distributors, restaurants, or at markets. Approximately two-thirds (64.19 
percent) always sell their shrimp at the market, 19.53 percent never sell their shrimp at the 
market, 9.3 percent rarely and 6.98 percent sometimes. There are two types of sellers: 
specialized shrimp sellers whose sales are limited to shrimp, which I denote by the dummy 
shrimp seller, i.e. they sell only shrimp (75 percent), and unspecialized shrimp sellers who 
switch between selling shrimp and fish (25 percent).29  
 In August 2008, 150 of the 216 fishermen who participated in the survey in April took part 
in an additional short survey where I collected data on cognitive skills. I measured cognitive 
skills by giving fishermen three questions of the form: Which option is better for you, selling 
75 liter shrimp for 1.2 Reais per liter, or, 130 liter for 0.75 Reais per liter. Fishermen had to 
respond quickly and were rewarded with 1 Real if they answered all three questions correctly. 
18.7 percent answered all three questions correctly (two correct answers: 52.7 percent, one 
correct answer: 26 percent, zero correct answers: 2.7 percent). 
 
 
3.2.3 Laboratory Data 
All 216 fishermen who participated in the survey took also part in April 2008 in a public goods 
and risk-aversion experiment (PGE and RAE) with considerable stakes (participants earned 
approximately 1.8 times their available daily income during the experimental sessions). The 
laboratory experiments did not take place at the markets, but were conducted individually 
during village meetings. In the PGE, the participants were divided in groups of three and played 
this experiment for one period.30 The payoff function was:  
( ) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +×+−=∏ ∑
≠
i
ij
jijii xxxxx 5.0)10(, . 
                                                 
29 Specialized shrimp sellers may be able to achieve higher selling prices. They can probably build up long-term 
relations more easily and know more about the dynamics of the shrimp markets because they usually go to the 
market every week to sell their shrimp, whereas the sellers who switch between catching fish and shrimp often 
interrupt their selling of shrimp for longer periods. I will take care of this concern and control for the seller type. 
 
30 Note that the group size in the PGE was four in one experimental session (N=16). The behavior in this session is 
very similar compared to all other sessions (average contribution in this session = 3.75, in all other sessions = 3.66; 
t=-0.12, p=0.90). Excluding this session from our further analysis would not lead to systematic changes.   
 
 40
 Each fisherman had to decide how many out of ten monetary units (MUs) he contributes 
( { }10,0∈ix ) to a group account.31 For each unit he contributed, he increased the monetary 
payoff of each of his group members j by 0.5 MUs, but at the same time, his own balance was 
reduced by 0.5 MUs. For each unit one of his group members decided to contribute, his own 
balance was increased by 0.5 MUs. Since the fishermen’s net return from contributing was 
negative, selfish fishermen should never contribute. However, if all three individuals in the 
group decided not to contribute, each of them only earned 10 MUs (10 – 0 + 0), compared to 15 
MUs (0 + 0.5 × 10 × 3) if all of them contributed all ten units. I denote the contribution 
decision as cooperativeness. The more fishermen contribute, the more cooperative they are, i.e. 
the more pronounced are their other-regarding preferences. After they made their contribution 
decision, they were asked about their expectations about the other group members' 
contributions. If they guessed them correctly, they could receive an additional five MUs. All 
rules were explained individually to the fishermen. No fisherman was informed about the 
identity of his group members.  
 Most fishermen contributed to the public good; only 16.2 percent did not contribute and 
11.1 percent contributed only one MU, 19.44 percent five MUs and 14.8 percent more than five 
MUs. I discriminate the fishermen in two equally sized groups: low cooperative fishermen (= 
LC fishermen) who contributed between zero and three MUs (51 percent), and, highly 
cooperative fishermen (= HC fishermen) who contributed at least four MUs (49 percent).  
 In the RAE, fishermen had to decide how many out of ten MUs they invest in a lottery that 
provides a return of 2.5 times the risked MUs with a probability of 0.5 and a return of zero with 
probability 0.5. Since the expected return from the lottery was greater than one (2.5 × 0.5 = 
1.25) risk-neutral and risk-seeking individuals should always invest all ten MUs in the lottery. 
Risk-averse participants, however, may invest less and very risk-averse participants should 
invest nothing or very few MUs.32 I observe that 21.8 percent decided not to risk any MUs, 
20.4 percent invested three, 23.6 percent invested five MUs and only 1.85 percent invested all 
ten MUs. I apply a median-split and discriminate two groups of fishermen: highly risk-averse 
                                                 
31 The participants were given two envelopes, one containing ten MUs and one containing 0 MUs. They could then 
transfer MUs and put both envelopes in a box. During the time of the decision, the experimenter turned his back so 
that the fisherman was sure that the experimenter did not know his decision. One MU always equaled one Real if the 
PGE was selected for payment. Participants only knew after they had played all experiments which one was actually 
paid out.  The instructions are in the appendix section A.1.1. 
 
32 The exact procedure of the RAE was as follows: Fishermen had to toss a coin and beforehand announce whether 
they would like to choose heads or tails and how many out the ten MUs they want to risk. If the announced side of 
the coin showed up, they would win 2.5 times the risked MUs, and if the other side showed up they would lose their 
risked MUs.   
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fishermen who invested less than three MUs (40 percent), and, low risk-averse fishermen who 
invested at least three MUs (60 percent).33  
 I also report data from a time preference experiment (TPE) conducted in 2006 where 51 of 
the 99 fishermen participated that I observed in 2008 at the markets. In the TPE, fishermen had 
to indicate whether they prefer one bottle of mineral water immediately or two bottles of 
mineral water the next day. If they preferred the mineral water immediately, they received one 
bottle directly after the experiment. If they preferred the two bottles the next day, I distributed 
vouchers with which they could collect the two bottles the next day in the village leader's 
house. The village leader was elected by the residents and is usually considered an 
extraordinarily trustworthy person.34 Participants were able to witness the experimenters giving 
the leaders the mineral water which was to be distributed the next day.35 The reason I chose 
mineral water was because it often measures immediate utility since individuals tend to 
consume it the moment they get it. This is not necessarily the case for money in the studied 
remote setting, where there are very few possibilities for spending money in the immediate 
vicinity. Overall, I observe that 58.6 percent were impatient and preferred one bottle of mineral 
water immediately. 
 Note that there is no significant relationship between the behavior in the PGE and the TPE. 
HC fishermen are not more or less likely to be impatient (Fisher's exact Test, p=1.00, two-
sided). The behavior in the RAE is also unrelated to the behavior in the TPE (Fisher's exact 
Test, p=1.00) but significantly negatively related to the behavior in the PGE (Fisher's exact 
Test, p=0.018), i.e. LC fishermen are more likely to be highly risk-averse.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
33 I assign the fishermen who invested three MUs (20.4 percent) to the low risk-averse fishermen.  
 
34 The village leader is the elected representative of the village and frequently visits meetings to present the situation 
and needs in his village.  
 
35 I have no reason to believe that the participating fishermen were concerned about not receiving their good the next 
day. Nevertheless, before individuals made their choice in the TPE, we assured them that they will receive their 
good. We also asked many participants if they were concerned about not receiving their goods – which was not the 
case. The experimenters were also no strangers to the participants. At least one of the experimenters was known 
before the experiments to the community leader (which had her/his contact details) and to other fishermen. After the 
experiments, we contacted the community leader to ask if all participants collected their goods – which was the case. 
When we re-visited the participants, none complained about not receiving her/his good. The instructions are in the 
appendix section A.1.2. 
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3.3 Predictions for Quality Misrepresentation and Market 
 Performance 
 
In this section, I derive the predictions for the relationships between individual preferences and 
individual market performance. To do this, I present a simple two-period bargaining model 
which abstracts from the complex interactions between the different buyers and sellers in our 
competitive field setting. Nevertheless, the model can provide some intuition how the sellers' 
preferences can affect their behavior and outcomes. In this model, there is one buyer and one 
seller. The seller wants to sell one product to the buyer for a certain price. Because there is 
asymmetric information about the quality of the product, the seller can sell the product for a 
“fair price” FAIRpp =  or an inappropriately high price FAIRpp > . To achieve an 
inappropriately high price, the seller must misrepresent quality (for instance by putting the 
bigger shrimp on top of the pile). There are two different seller types: (a) selfish sellers and (b) 
cooperative sellers. Selfish sellers care only about the achieved price p, and their utility 
function in the two-period case is: 
(1)      21 ppU iS ×+= δ , 
 
with iδ  = discount rate of seller i ( 10 <≤ iδ ), i.e. iδ can be understood as time preferences 
with numbers closer to 0 indicating that i is impatient. In contrast, cooperative sellers derive 
disutility from selling a product for an inappropriately high price. One possibility for modeling 
this is to assume that cooperative sellers care about the difference between p and FAIRp . 
Formally, I say that if FAIRpp > , cooperative sellers derive disutility depending on iλ  
( 0>iλ ) which is an individual parameter expressing the degree of disutility from selling a 
product for an inappropriately high price, and, the total disutility if FAIRpp >  is 
)( FAIRi pp −λ . Therefore, a cooperative seller's utility function in the two-period case is: 
 
(2)   [ ] [ ])0,max()0,max( ,222,111 FAIRiiFAIRiCOOP ppppppU −−+−−= λδλ . 
 
In order to predict the market performance of the different seller types, we need to know 
whether sellers will try to sell a product for FAIRpp >  in t=1. This of course depends on 
whether buyers will find out in t=2 about the inappropriately high price in t=1 and how they 
react in this case. For simplicity, let us assume the following: (i) buyers know definitely in t=2 
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whether an inappropriately high price was charged in t=1, i.e. the detection probability is set to 
one, (ii) if an inappropriately high price was charged in t=1, buyers are only willing to pay 
DETECTEDp  ( FAIRDETECTED pp < ) in t=2, i.e. they deduct a risk premium ( DETECTEDFAIR pp − ) when 
buying a product from a buyer who cheated in the previous period.36 Let us further assume that 
the risk premium is so high that a selfish seller with 1=iδ  will never misrepresent quality in 
t=1 if the detection probability is set to 1, i.e. FAIRDETECTEDFAIR pppp −>− . Accordingly, selfish 
sellers will charge FAIRpp >  in t=1 if 
(3)   FAIRiFAIRDETECTEDi pppp ×+≥×+ δδ   
DETECTEDFAIR
FAIR
i pp
pp
−
−≤⇔ δ . 
As we observe, the decision for the selfish seller to charge an inappropriately high price in t=1 
depends on his iδ , i.e. the more impatient the selfish seller is, the more likely he is to sell his 
product at an inappropriately high price in t=1.  
 
PREDICTION 1: (i) Impatient selfish sellers misrepresent quality more than patient selfish 
sellers. Therefore, the market performance of selfish sellers depends on their level of 
impatience; (ii) impatient selfish sellers achieve lower selling prices in all periods t>1 
compared to patient selfish sellers. 
 
Let us now take a look at the behavior and performance of cooperative sellers whose disutility 
from selling a product for an inappropriately high price is so high that they would misrepresent 
quality in t=1. I denote these as highly cooperative sellers (= HC sellers). The following must 
apply for a HC seller:  
(4) [ ]>×+ FAIRiFAIR pp ,2,1 δ [ ])()( ,222,111 FAIRiiFAIRi pppppp −−+−− λδλ  
⇔  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ])(11 FAIRiiFAIRi pppp −−×+>×+ λδδ  
)( FAIRiFAIR pppp −−>⇔ λ  
1>⇔ iλ  
Thus, for a HC seller with 1>= ii λλ ,  the decision whether to sell a product for an 
inappropriately high price does not depend on his iδ  i.e. impatience plays no role for this seller 
type. 
 
                                                 
36 Alternatively, we could assume that a buyer who cheated in t=1 faces with a positive probability the risk that the 
trade relation is terminated in t=2 and in this case cannot sell his product in t=2 (see Brown et al. 2004). 
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PREDICTION 2: (i) There are no differences in quality misrepresentation between impatient 
and patient highly cooperative sellers. Therefore, (ii) there are no differences in market 
performance between impatient and patient highly cooperative seller, both achieve similar 
selling prices in t>1. 
 
Note that predictions 2a and 2b are only true for HC sellers ( 1>iλ ). For low cooperative 
sellers (= LC sellers) with 10 >≤ iλ , time preferences can affect quality misrepresentation. 
Thus, from now on I will always differentiate between LC sellers (which include the selfish 
sellers) and HC sellers.  
 
Therefore, if we do not control for impatience we should find that,  
 
PREDICTION 3: overall, given that prediction 1 and 2 are true, HC sellers outperform LC 
sellers because one fraction of the LC sellers –the impatient– underperforms compared to HC 
sellers.37  
 
Risk preferences can also play an important role for market performance in our setting because 
a seller has to propose or accept a price without knowing a potential buyer's maximal 
acceptable price. Thus, a more risk-averse seller should be willing to pay a higher risk premium 
to avoid the possibility of not being able to sell his shrimp for the asked price.  
 
PREDICTION 4: More risk-averse sellers underperform compared to less risk-averse sellers 
and achieve lower selling prices. 
 
 
 
3.4 Predicting Quality Misrepresentation  
 
In this section, I investigate the relationship between other-regarding preferences, impatience, 
and quality misrepresentation. I measure quality misrepresentation by the difference between 
the average size of the shrimp on the top and the bottom of the pile. If the first part of 
prediction 1 is true, we should observe that there are differences in the degree of quality 
                                                 
37 Prediction 3 is sensitive to the detection probability. With a low detection probability, it is possible that overall HC 
sellers do not outperform LC sellers.  
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misrepresentation between the different seller types: Impatient low cooperative sellers (which I 
denote for simplicity as I-LC, where I stands for impatient and LC for low cooperative) should 
misrepresent quality more than patient low cooperative sellers (P-LC) and highly cooperative 
sellers regardless whether they are impatient (I-HC) or patient (P-HC). If the first part of 
prediction 2 holds, there should be no differences in quality misrepresentation between I-HC or 
P-HC sellers.  
 I find that there are no significant differences in quality misrepresentations overall between 
LC and HC sellers or between impatient and patient sellers. LC sellers (N=18) misrepresent 
quality by on average 8.32 percent and HC sellers (N=15) by 6.12 percent (T-Test, t=0.46, 
p=0.648). I have data about the time preferences from 23 sellers that include the measure of 
quality misrepresentation. Impatient sellers (N=13) misrepresent quality by 8.27 percent 
compared to patient sellers (N=10) who misrepresent quality by 4.20 percent (T-Test, t=0.76, 
p=0.454). After combining other-regarding and time preferences, I find – as predicted – that 
there are no significant differences between I-HC and P-HC sellers (Wilcoxon Rank-Sum Test, 
z=-0.853, p=0.394) but significant differences between I-LC and P-LC sellers (0.047<p<0.087, 
depending on whether I use a Wilcoxon Rank-Sum Test, a T-Test or a Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
test of equal distributions). I-LC sellers misrepresent quality to the largest extent (11.65 
percent) and significantly more than the other three seller types P-LC, I-HC and P-HC 
combined (0.060<p<0.099, depending on whether I use Wilcoxon Ranksum Test, T-Test or 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of equal distributions).38 Note also that the difference between I-LC 
and P-LC is approximately three times larger than the difference between I-HC and P-HC.  
 Regression Table 1 presents three models with quality misrepresentation as the dependent 
variable. In the first model, I use a cooperativeness dummy that equals one if the seller is HC39, 
an impatience dummy, and a control for whether the shrimp pile was big (it is easier to find out 
in small piles if the shrimp placed on top are bigger, accordingly quality misrepresentation may 
be more pronounced in big piles). I find that HC sellers do not misrepresent quality less than 
LC sellers (t=0.11, p=0.915). Impatient sellers do not significantly more misrepresent quality 
than patient sellers (t=0.78, p=0.443). 
 In the second model, I enter the interaction term impatience × cooperativeness. I observe 
that both the impatience dummy and the interaction term impatience × cooperativeness are 
                                                 
38 Note that collecting such data is difficult. I stopped collection after I realized that some fishermen could become 
suspicious of this form of data collection.  
 
39 I use the cooperativeness dummy instead of the variable cooperativeness (which specifies the contributions from 
0-10 MUs) because the variable inflation factors (which indicates multicollinearity problems) when using the 
variable cooperativeness are sometimes very high in the presented models (e.g. VIF of the interaction term is 9.6 
with the cooperativeness variable and only 5.2 with the cooperativeness dummy) and also because the sample size is 
small. For more information on VIF consult e.g. Kutner et al. (2004). 
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marginally significant. I-LC sellers have 10.9 percent larger differences between top and 
bottom shrimp than P-LC sellers (t=2.08, p=0.052). There is a significant negative interaction 
between impatience and cooperativeness, showing that cooperativeness restrains impatient 
sellers from misrepresenting quality (t=-1.76, p=0.095). There are no differences between P-LC 
and P-HC sellers. In model 3, I further control for the beliefs in the PGE, experience, and 
whether the seller is a specialized shrimp seller. We observe that this model is considerably 
more accurate and that the impatience dummy and the interaction term are now significant at 
the 5 percent level. The findings in this section provide unequivocal evidence in favor of the 
predictions 1 and 2. Moreover, we find that specialized shrimp sellers misrepresent quality less 
(t=-2.15, p=0.050), which may have to do with learning since they are more experienced selling 
shrimp and may have figured out that placing big shrimp on top can lead to a bad reputation.  
 
 
TABLE 1―DETERMINANTS OF QUALITY MISREPRESENTATION   
(OLS) 
Dependent Variable Difference in shrimp size between the top and bottom of the pile in percent 
Model (1) (2) (3) 
    
0.82 11.01 6.23 
Cooperativeness 
(7.55) (6.85) (21.16) 
3.92 10.93* 10.76** 
Impatience 
(5.00) (5.26) (4.91) 
 -16.60* -19.06** 
Impatience  ×  Cooperativeness 
 (9.43) (8.55) 
  8.25 
Belief in PGE  
  (20.70) 
  -0.10 
Experience  
  (0.14) 
  -10.44** 
Shrimp Seller 
  (4.89) 
6.33 8.13 9.95 
Big Shrimp Pile  
(6.69) (5.85) (5.99) 
6.40 3.05 14.17* 
Constant 
(3.83) (3.82) (7.13) 
R2 0.085 0.190 0.299 
N 23 23 23 
 Notes: *** 99-percent significance, ** 95-percent significance; * 90-percent significance. Robust standard errors 
in parentheses. Cooperativeness, impatience, belief in PGE, shrimp seller and big pile of shrimp are all dummy 
variables. The cooperativeness dummy is one if the individual contributed at least four MUs in the public goods 
experiment. The belief in the PGE dummy is one if the individual beliefs that his group members contribute on 
average more than three MUs in the public goods experiment. The shrimp seller dummy is one if the seller is a 
specialized shrimp seller. The big shrimp pile dummy is one if the pile contains at least 50 liters of shrimp. 
Experience defines for how many years the seller has been catching shrimp.  
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3.5 Predicting Market Performance 
 
In this section, I relate the market performance of sellers to their other-regarding, risk, and time 
preferences. I measure market performance with the achieved selling price per liter shrimp. The 
section starts by investigating market performance before controlling for impatience. According 
to predictions 3 and 4, we should observe that highly cooperative and low risk-averse sellers 
achieve higher selling prices. Thereafter, I investigate market performance after controlling for 
impatience. The second part of prediction 1 says that I-LC sellers underperform compared to P-
LC sellers. The second part of prediction 2 says that there are no differences between I-HC and 
P-HC sellers.  
 
3.5.1 Other-regarding Preferences and Market Performance 
Figure 2 illustrates the achieved selling prices per liter shrimp at the biggest market depending 
on the sellers’ cooperativeness. We observe the achieved prices for the LC sellers who 
contributed little in the PGE (0-3 MUs) on the left side. The shape of the box tells us that half 
of the LC sellers achieve between 0.8 and 1 Reais. The median is one Real and there are only 
two LC sellers who get more than 1.2 Reais. On the right side, we observe the achieved prices 
for the HC sellers who contributed at least four MUs in the PGE. Approximately 50 percent 
receive between 1 and 1.5 Reais. The difference between the LC and HC sellers is highly 
significant (T-Test, t=-3.036, p=0.002, two-sided) and large. HC sellers achieve on average 
approximately 20 percent more per liter shrimp at the biggest market (1.19 vs. 0.99 Reais). 
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source: data from biggest market
Figure 2: Other-regarding Preferences and Selling Prices
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 In Regression Table 2, I investigate whether this finding holds in two OLS regressions40 
after controlling for factors that should play a role for the selling prices (e.g. risk preferences or 
shrimp size), and those that could do so (e.g. experience or quantity of shrimp sold). The 
regression model 1 only controls for risk preferences and includes market fixed effects. 
Regression model 2 also includes date fixed effects, shrimp size and potentially important 
covariates like the quantity of shrimp sold, the seller's experience, and whether the seller is 
specialized in selling shrimp. The outcomes in the two models with regard to cooperativeness 
are similar. I also find that HC sellers achieve significantly and considerably higher prices than 
LC sellers after controlling for shrimp size, risk preferences, and different covariates. For 
instance, we can see in model 2 that a HC seller receives 0.136 Reais more per liter shrimp 
compared to a LC seller (t=2.11, p=0.038).41 Therefore, I find support for prediction 3.  
 As expected, shrimp size is positively related to the selling price (p<0.001); the seller's 
experience and specialization in selling shrimp also matter (p<0.040). The quantity of shrimp 
sold does not significantly predict the price per liter shrimp (p=0.556), suggesting that there are 
no important quantity reductions at our shrimp markets. Note also (not shown) that cognitive 
skills do not significantly predict market performance. For instance, if I introduce cognitive 
skills as an additional independent variable in model 2, it is uninformative (Observations: 68, 
coefficient=0.021, p=0.508 in model 1). Sellers with better cognitive skills measured by the 
calculation task do not perform better. 
                                                 
40 Since the dependent variable price per liter shrimp is not normally distributed, using a generalized linear model 
(GLM) might be more appropriate. I also used the GLM and find that results do not change much. If at all, the 
findings with regard to cooperativeness and risk-aversion get more pronounced and more robust.  
 
41 If I use the cooperativeness variable which specifies how many of the ten MUs were contributed in the regression 
instead of the cooperativeness dummy, I get similar results. For instance, every MU contributed more is associated 
with a 0.018 Reais increase in selling prices in model 2 (t=2.13, p=0.037). 
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TABLE 2―DETERMINANTS OF MARKET 
PERFORMANCE I  (OLS) 
Dependent Variable Selling price per liter shrimp 
Model (1) (2) 
   
0.092** 0.136** 
Cooperativeness 
(0.046) (0.065) 
-0.130*** -0.154*** 
Risk-Aversion 
(0.047) (0.046) 
 0.153*** 
Shrimp Size (Quality) 
 (0.044) 
 -0.088 
Shrimp Color  
 (0.053) 
 -0.087 
Belief in PGE  
 (0.054) 
 0.003** 
Experience 
 (0.001) 
 0.098** 
Shrimp Seller 
 (0.047) 
 -0.000 
Liter Shrimp sold 
 (0.000) 
Market Fixed Effects yes yes 
Date Fixed Effects no yes 
0.961*** 0.447*** 
Constant 
(0.038) (0.168) 
R2 0.814 0.855 
N 99 93 
 Notes: *** 99-percent significance, ** 95-percent significance; * 90-percent 
significance. Robust standard errors in parentheses. High cooperativeness, high risk-
aversion, color of shrimp, belief in PGE and shrimp seller are all dummy variables. The 
cooperativeness dummy is one if the individual contributed at least four MUs in the 
public goods experiment. The risk-aversion dummy is one if the individual invested at 
least three MUs in the RAE.  Color of shrimp dummy is one if the shrimp are colored. 
The belief in the PGE dummy is one if the individual beliefs that his group members 
contribute on average more than three MUs in the public goods experiment. The shrimp 
seller dummy is one if the seller is a specialized shrimp seller. Experience defines for 
how many years the seller has been catching shrimp. 
 
 
 
 50
3.5.2 Risk-aversion and Market Performance 
The next boxplots in Figure 3 illustrate the selling prices at the biggest market depending on the 
sellers' level of risk-aversion. We observe the achieved selling prices for the highly risk-averse 
fishermen who risked a maximum of two MUs in the RAE on the left side. The shape of the 
box shows that approximately half of the highly risk-averse fishermen achieve between 0.8 and 
1.1 Reais and the mean is 0.99 Reais. In contrast, the less risk-averse fishermen depicted on the 
right side who risked at least three MUs in the RAE achieve significantly higher prices (T-Test, 
t=-2.19, p=0.033). Approximately 50 percent of the low risk-averse sellers receive between 1 
and 1.4 Reais and the mean is 1.13 Reais.  
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Source: data from biggest market
Figure 3: Risk-aversion and Selling Prices
 
  
It becomes further clear in Regression Tables 2 (and 3) that the level of risk-aversion 
significantly hampers market performance. The level of risk-aversion is highly predictive, even 
after controlling for other covariates like cooperativeness, shrimp size, or impatience. In model 
2 of Table 2, for instance, we observe that highly risk-averse sellers achieve 0.154 Reais less 
per liter shrimp than low risk-averse sellers (t=3.33, p=0.001), indicating a substantial impact 
of risk-aversion on market performance.42 Thus, I provide evidence in favor of prediction 4. 
 
                                                 
42 I attain similar results if I use the risk-aversion variable which specifies how many of the ten MUs were not 
invested in the lottery instead of the highly risk-averse dummy in the regression. In model 2, for instance, each fewer 
invested MU is associated with a 0.028 Reais decrease in selling prices (t=2.59, p=0.012). 
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3.5.3  Other-regarding Preferences, Impatience, and Market Performance 
Finally, I investigate the effect of other-regarding preferences after controlling for impatience. I 
have a total of 51 observations which include the selling price and the laboratory measures of 
other-regarding and time preferences. Figure 4 illustrates the achieved selling prices for four 
types: I-LC, P-LC, I-HC, and P-HC. The two bars on the left indicate the average selling prices 
for the LC sellers. While there is no significant difference between impatient (mean = 1.30 
Reais) and patient sellers (1.41 Reais; T-test, t=-0.738, p=0.232, one-sided) overall, we can 
clearly observe a big difference between I-LC and P-LC sellers. I-LC sellers receive on average 
1.14 Reais whereas P-LC sellers receive approximately 30 percent more (1.51 vs. 1.14 Reais, 
t=-1.67, p=0.055, one-sided; Wilcoxon Rank-Sum Test p=0.079). There is no such negative 
effect of impatience for the HC sellers. I-HC and P-HC sellers receive approximately the same 
(1.33 vs. 1.41, t=0.39, p=0.649, one-sided).  
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Figure 4: Other-Regarding Preferences, Impatience & Selling Price
note: standard error bands shown  
 Next, I present in Regression Table 3 two models for observing whether we find the same 
pattern after controlling for size and the other covariates I used in Regression Table 2. As 
suggested in Figure 4, we observe an interesting relationship between impatience and 
cooperativeness for market performance. First, the cooperativeness dummy, which now shows 
the effect of high cooperativeness for patient sellers, is insignificant and negative, suggesting 
that high cooperativeness does not improve performance for patient sellers. Second, the 
impatience dummy, which presents the effect of impatience for the LC sellers, is highly 
significant. An I-LC seller receives between 0.229 and 0.264 Reais less per liter shrimp 
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compared to a P-LC seller (significant at 1 percent level), depending on the model 
specification. Third, the interaction between impatience and cooperativeness is positive and 
highly significant, showing that high cooperativeness helps impatient sellers to improve their 
performance (p<0.006).43 Size and risk-aversion are the only other variables that predict market 
performance significantly (p<0.004). Thus, I find support for predictions 1 and 2, and that the 
overall effect that HC sellers achieve higher selling prices than LC sellers is mediated by I-LC 
sellers. 
                                                 
43 I obtain similar results if I use the variable cooperativeness and not the cooperativeness dummy. The interaction 
impatience x cooperativeness is highly significant in both models (p<0.011). 
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TABLE 3―DETERMINANTS OF MARKET PERFORMANCE II  
(OLS) 
Dependent Variable Selling price per liter shrimp 
Model (1) (2) 
   
-0.101 -0.133 
Cooperativeness 
(0.061) (0.090) 
-0.229*** -0.264*** 
Impatience 
(0.067) (0.070) 
0.271*** 0.368*** 
Impatience  × Cooperativeness 
(0.093) (0.098) 
-0.191*** -0.196*** 
Risk-Aversion 
(0.060) (0.064) 
 0.222*** 
Shrimp Size (Quality) 
 (0.069) 
 0.009 
Shrimp Color  
 (0.074) 
 -0.055 
Belief in PGE  
 (0.073) 
 0.003 
Experience 
 (0.003) 
 0.003 
Shrimp Seller 
 (0.066) 
 -0.000 
Liter Shrimp sold 
 (0.000) 
Market Fixed Effects yes yes 
Date Fixed Effects no yes 
1.140*** 0.629** 
Constant 
(0.058) (0.243) 
R2 0.899 0.924 
N 51 48 
 Notes: *** 99-percent significance, ** 95-percent significance; * 90-percent significance. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. High cooperativeness, high risk-aversion, impatience, color of shrimp, 
belief in PGE and shrimp seller are all dummy variables. The cooperativeness dummy is one if the 
individual contributed at least four MUs in the public goods experiment. The risk-aversion dummy is 
one if the individual invested at least three MUs in the RAE.  Color of shrimp dummy is one if the 
shrimp are colored. The belief in the PGE dummy is one if the individual beliefs that his group 
members contribute on average more than three MUs in the public goods experiment. The shrimp 
seller dummy is one if the seller is a specialized shrimp seller. Experience defines for how many years 
the seller has been catching shrimp. 
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3.6 Does Market Exposure affect Individual Preferences? 
 
I showed in the last section that certain (combinations) of individual preferences are associated 
with better market performance. A potential follow-up question is whether in our setting 
individual preferences affect (performance in) markets or whether (performance in) markets 
affect individual preferences. My data allows investigating whether sellers who are less 
exposed to markets, i.e. sellers who do not always sell their shrimp at markets, are endowed 
with different individual preferences. If the studied markets affect individual preferences, 
according to my previous findings, there are reasons to believe that sellers who are more 
exposed to markets are more cooperative, less risk-averse, and less impatient because these are 
the individual preferences associated with a better market performance.44 45 I find that this is 
not the case. Sellers who always sell their catch at markets are, if at all, less cooperative and 
contribute on average 3.51 MUs in the PGE compared to the 3.96 MUs the sellers who do not 
always sell their catch on markets contribute (t=1.12, p=0.261). Sellers who always sell their 
shrimp at the markets are also not less impatient; if anything, they are rather more impatient 
(Spearman Rank Correlation, r=-0.161, p=0.112).46 
 Market exposure also does not affect the level of risk-aversion. Fishermen who always sell 
their catch at markets risk 2.99 MUs on average in the RAE, approximately the same amount 
that fishermen risk who do not always sell their catch on markets (3.06 MUs, t=0.23, p=0.819). 
Therefore, the data suggests that the exposure to shrimp markets does not affect individual 
preferences because sellers who are not or less exposed to the markets have no significantly 
different sets of individual preferences.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
44 Of course, having these preferences may be also beneficial when selling shrimp not directly at the shrimp market. 
However, since the competitive pressure seems to be high at the shrimp markets, it is plausible that the shrimp 
markets affect individual preferences in the suggested direction.  
 
45 It could also be that there is a selection which type of fisherman is more likely to sell his shrimp at markets. If 
selection plays a role, we should observe that sellers who are more exposed to the markets are more cooperative, less 
risk-averse, and more patient. Since this is not the case, selection does not appear to play an important role.  
 
46 One may argue that more market exposure reduces the probability that there are I-LC sellers at the markets (see 
sections 3.3 to 3.5). This is not the case, however. As many as 32.35 percent (N=22) of the sellers who always sell 
their catch at markets are I-LC, which is more than the fraction of P-LC (17.64 percent) and the fraction of P-HC 
sellers (17.64 percent). The remaining 32.35 percent are I-HC sellers.   
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3.7 Conclusion 
 
The goal of this paper is to examine how other-regarding, risk, and time preferences are related 
to behavior and performance in naturally occurring markets where reputation and asymmetric 
information play an important role. I present and test a simple model based on the idea that 
other-regarding preferences can restrain impatient sellers from yielding to their temptation to 
engage in uncooperative behavior and thus prevent them from hampering their market 
performance. The model is supported by the data. Impatient less cooperative sellers 
misrepresent quality more compared to the other seller types. Moreover, I find that less 
cooperative sellers receive considerably lower prices for products of similar quality compared 
to more cooperative sellers, and that time preferences mediate the difference in performance. 
Less cooperative sellers only underperform compared to the other seller types if they are 
impatient. Concerning risk-aversion, I find new evidence from the field that risk-aversion is 
negatively related to market performance.  
 These findings provide insights into the role of other-regarding preferences and corroborate 
the relevance of social preference and reciprocity theories in understanding behavior and 
outcomes in naturally occurring markets. The studied markets share features with many other 
typical market settings; nevertheless, it would be interesting to investigate the relationship 
between individual preferences and market performance in markets with different 
characteristics. For instance, how are individual preferences related to individual performance 
on spot markets? According to the presented model, other-regarding preferences play a less 
important role in markets where reputation building is not crucial.   
 The study shows the importance of investigating combinations of different individual 
preferences to better understand economic outcomes in natural markets. It would also be 
interesting to observe whether there are other preference combinations that further explain 
market performance. It could be, for instance, that risk-loving selfish sellers also significantly 
underperform compared to risk-loving other-regarding sellers. In this paper, I have shown that 
other-regarding preferences can restrain impatient individuals from uncooperative behavior. 
However, studying whether impatience deters individuals with insufficiently pronounced other-
regarding preferences from being cooperative also seems worthwhile. In any case, developing a 
more general behavioral model that accounts for combinations of different preferences within 
one individual would be very interesting.  
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3.A  Appendix Tables and Figures 
 
TABLE a―SUMMARY STATISTICS                         
(Means) 
  Mean Observations 
Market Data   
1.272 
Selling price (in Reais) 
(0.051) 
99 
2.966 
Shrimp size (in cm) 
(0.042) 
99 
83.516 
Liter shrimp sold 
(8.2478) 
93 
0.441 
Big shrimp pile 
(0.052) 
93 
0.444 
Shrimp color 
(0.050) 
99 
7.320 Difference between top and bottom 
shrimp (in %) (2.346) 
33 
0.335 Difference between shrimp size guess and 
actual shrimp size (in cm) (0.147) 
37 
Laboratory Data   
3.667 
Contributions in PGE 
(0.189) 
216 
0.486 
Cooperativeness 
(0.034) 
216 
0.551 
Belief in PGE 
(0.034) 
216 
0.586 
Impatience 
(0.050) 
99 
3.018 
Risked MUs in RAE 
(0.150) 
216 
0.398 
Risk-aversion 
(0.033) 
216 
Survey Data   
17.723 
Experience (in years) 
(0.806) 
215 
0.750 
Specialized shrimp seller 
(0.029) 
216 
1.873 
Cognitive skills 
(0.060) 
150 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Sample sizes differ because data come from different sources. 
Market data was collected at the market in April-May 2008. Big shrimp pile is a dummy that equals 
one if the pile contains at least 50 liters. Shrimp color is dummy that equals one if the shrimp were 
colored. Laboratory data was collected in village meetings in April 2008 and 2006. Cooperativeness is 
a dummy that equals one if at least four MUs were contributed. Belief in PGE is a dummy that equals 
one if the participant believed the other players contribute on average at least 3.5 MUs. Impatience is a 
dummy that equals one if the participant preferred one bottle mineral water immediately over two 
bottles the next day. Risk-aversion is a dummy that equals one if the participant invested less than 
three MUs in the RAE. The survey data was collected in April and August 2008. Cognition skills 
define how many of the three calculation questions were answered correctly. Specialized shrimp seller 
is a dummy that equals one if the seller is a specialized shrimp seller.  
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Figure a: Picture of Shrimp Market and Shrimp Piles 
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Chapter 4 
 
AN EXPLORATION OF THIRD AND SECOND PARTY 
PUNISHMENT IN TEN SIMPLE GAMES  
 
 
 
Chapter Overview 
 
This paper identifies the motives behind punishment from unaffected third parties and affected 
second parties using a within-subject design in ten simple games. We apply a classification 
analysis and find that a parsimonious model assuming that subjects are either inequity averse or 
selfish best explains the pattern of punishment from both third and second parties. Despite their 
unaffected position, we do not find that third parties punish in a more impartial or normative 
manner.  
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4.1. Introduction 
 
Third parties play a crucial role in many institutions: They serve in courts, as referees or 
arbitrators.47 The US legal system, for instance, relies on their judgment in juries when it comes 
to the application of sanctions. Third parties are also important with regard to informal 
sanctions (Homans, 1961) and, in fact, their interventions seem to be essential in the 
explanation of norm enforcement, as they are often more numerous than affected second parties 
(Bendor and Swistak, 2001) or the only parties present (Greif, 1993, 1994), and hence their 
sanctions are potentially more damaging than those from second parties. 
 Despite their importance, little is known about how third parties sanction others. In 
particular, it is unclear whether third parties sanction in a different manner than second parties. 
In principle, third parties might sanction in a more impartial, "normative", and controlled 
manner, and less egocentrically (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004). Adam Smith apparently had this 
idea in mind when he introduced the concept of the “impartial spectator” in his Theory of Moral 
Sentiments, a party who is not personally affected, making decisions from beyond the 
limitations of egocentric biases. In fact, the prevalence of institutions that rely on third parties 
implies that they are likely to make more appropriate decisions. However, it also seems 
plausible that even third parties cannot completely eliminate egocentric biases (Ross et al., 
1976; Babcock et al., 1995). The concerns about the selection of jury members in many law 
cases suggest that third parties can make very inappropriate decisions in the context of 
sanctioning (e.g. Kennedy, 1997).  
 Recent models of other-regarding preferences propose competing explanations for third 
and/or second party punishment. Theories based on inequity-aversion (Fehr and Schmidt 1999, 
Falk and Fischbacher 2006) predict punishment of richer co-players if that reduces the payoff 
distance, while reciprocity theories predict punishment of an individual if she harmed the 
aggressor (Rabin 1993, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004; Cox et al., 2007). Further, Bolton 
and Ockenfels (2000) predict punishment of any co-player if that brings the aggressor’s relative 
payoff closer to the average relative payoff, Levine (1998) posits the existence of spiteful types 
who punish indiscriminately and type-reciprocal agents who punish selfish or spiteful co-
players, and López-Pérez (2008) predicts punishment of norm deviators. 
 This paper applies a within-subjects experimental analysis and the classification method by 
El-Gamal and Grether (1995), with two key objectives: (i) to study and compare the motives 
                                                 
47 We say that a player C is a third party with respect to a player A if her material payoff does not depend on the 
decisions of A (note however that it is possible that the material payoff of A depends on the decisions of C; for 
instance, it could be the case that C sanctions A and thus reduces her material payoff). We also say that a player B is 
a second party with respect to A if her material payoff depends on A’s decisions.  
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behind third and second party punishment, and (ii) to provide a stringent test of recent models 
and determine which one best accounts for punishment in a large range of situations.48 Our 
paper suggests several insights into the key motives behind punishment. First, we find that both 
third and second party punishment is predominantly targeted towards richer co-players. Second, 
the classification analysis shows that a model assuming that subjects are either inequity-averse 
or selfish captures the occurrence of third and second party punishment across our ten games 
better than any other equally parsimonious alternative. While models that also include small 
fractions of spiteful (for third and second parties) and reciprocal (for second parties) types are 
slightly more accurate, they come at the cost of increased complexity. Third, we observe that 
the strength of punishment depends heavily on the size of the payoff disadvantage (in 3P and 
2P). Fourth, and contrary to the idea that third parties are less "infected" by egocentric or "non-
normative" motives than second parties, we observe that third party punishment generally 
resembles second party punishment and find no support for the conjecture that third parties are 
impartial and enforce (informal) rules in a normative manner.  
 A large body of experimental research shows that subjects are often willing to spend money 
to reduce another player’s payoff – i.e. to punish her – even if no future benefits can follow 
from this behavior. In the ultimatum game, responders frequently punish proposers for making 
unfair offers (Güth et al. 1982, Camerer and Thaler 1995, Roth 1995), while non-contributors 
are often punished in public goods games with a punishment stage (Fehr and Gächter 2000). 
However, this literature has a completely different focus than our study because it is restricted 
to second party punishment and because the analyzed games are not well suited for 
discriminating the motives behind punishment. In the ultimatum game, responders might reject 
offers due to inequity-aversion, reciprocity, spite, or to punish a violation of an equity norm, 
while punishment in the public goods game can be explained in terms of inequity-aversion, 
reciprocity, spite, or as a reaction to a transgression of a cooperation norm.  
 The studies by Falk et al. (2005) and Dawes et al. (2007) have provided progress in our 
understanding of second-party punishment, although considerable uncertainties remain 
regarding the main motives. First of all, the two studies come to different conclusions. Falk et 
al. (2005) find that "retaliation seems to be the most important motive behind fairness-driven 
informal sanctions" (ibid, p. 2017) whereas Dawes et al. (2007) emphasize the importance of 
the "egalitarian motives". Moreover, these studies do not allow for perfect discrimination 
between some motives. For instance, the results from Falk et al. (2005) are not only consistent 
with reciprocity (i.e., retaliation) but also with a model predicting punishment of players who 
                                                 
48 The reader interested in similar approaches to understand behavioral decision rules may consult Engle-Warnick 
(2003).  
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deviate from a norm of cooperation/efficiency (see López-Pérez, 2008). In turn, reciprocity 
might explain part of the results in Dawes et al. (2007). In this study, subjects were placed in 
small groups and allocated a randomly determined sum of money which could be used to 
reduce the income of their co-players’. Since all players could engage in damaging, they could 
damage conditional on their expectations about the damaging from the other subjects, i.e. 
retaliate (see Zizzo, 2003).  
 In addition, the studies by Falk et al. (2005) and Dawes et al. (2007) pay little attention to 
players’ heterogeneity because they consider very few games and use a between-subject design. 
This seems to be a limitation because punishment is very likely caused by multiple 
motivational forces. On the one hand, different players might have different reasons to punish 
in the same game –the evidence from Falk et al. (2005) is indeed consistent with this. On the 
other hand, the same player might punish for one reason (say, inequity-aversion) in one game, 
and for another reason (say, reciprocity) in a different game. Therefore, we believe that it is 
crucial to investigate which forces are relatively more powerful for each player across a large 
range of games and to provide an analysis that allows classifying subjects as (predominantly) 
inequity-averse, reciprocal, etc. 
 Few studies address third party punishment (e.g. Zizzo 2003; Carpenter and Matthews, 
2005; Charness et al., 2008) and Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) is the only study which compares 
it to second party punishment. The authors report that third parties punish unfair allocation 
choices in a dictator game and defectors in a prisoner’s dilemma game, although less strongly 
than second parties do. However, it remains unclear why third parties punish in these games (it 
could be because they punish violations from norms of cooperation/equity, but also because of 
inequity-aversion, spite, or because they are type-reciprocal á la Levine, 1998) and why they 
punish less than second parties (this might be an artifact of their experimental design, as the 
payoff disadvantage was larger between first and second parties than between first and third 
parties). To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to (i) identify the motives behind 
third party punishment in a comprehensive design and (ii) investigate whether third parties are 
impartial and less prone to punish in an egocentric or "non-normative" manner than second 
parties. 
 Our results indicate that it can be misleading to assume that third parties are impartial, make 
less egocentric choices, and enforce (informal) rules in a normative manner. In addition, this 
study gives important implications for the further development of recent theories of other-
regarding preferences. Inequity-aversion appears to be an indispensable factor in explaining the 
occurrence and strength of third and second party punishment, while reciprocity and spite play 
an important although relatively minor role in explaining the occurrence of second party 
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punishment. In particular, we believe that reciprocity should not be used alone in predicting 
punishment in general, as it fails to explain any third party punishment. 
 The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents the experimental design 
and procedure. Section 4.3 describes our research hypotheses. In section 4.4, we report the 
results from the classification analysis and study which factors affect the occurrence and 
strength of second and third party punishment. The section 4.5 concludes. 
 
 
4.2 Experimental Design and Procedures  
 
There are two treatments in our experimental design: A second party punishment treatment (2P) 
and a third party punishment treatment (3P). Participants in 2P play ten two-player games, 
while participants in 3P play ten three-player games. All these games have a two-stage 
structure. In the first stage of both treatments, one player (the first party) chooses between a 
left-hand and a right-hand allocation of payoffs between herself and another player (the second 
party). Table 1 shows the two allocations available in each game (we explain in section 4.3 
why we chose these particular allocations). They are identical in 2P and 3P and presented in 
points (10 points = 1 Swiss Franc).  
 
TABLE 1―THE ALLOCATIONS IN THE 10 GAMES 
  Game 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Left (150,150) (100,100) (560,60) (150,90) (220,260) (280,240) (250,80) (100,100) (250,150) (250,150)Allocation 
Right (590,60) (50,530) (120,140) (50,630) (220,400) (390,240)  (80,250) (50,150) (110,290) (330,70) 
 
The second stage differs in the two treatments. In any game of 2P, the second party can 
spend points out of her allocation share to reduce the first party’s payoff –i.e., to punish her. In 
any game of 3P, a third player (the third party) can punish the first or/and the second parties, 
while the second party in 3P makes no decision, i.e. she is a “bystander”. The third party is 
endowed with 200 points in each allocation of each game meaning the first party’s choice never 
affects her payoff in the first stage. The punishment technology is the same in 2P and 3P: Up to 
50 points can be used to punish and each point spent reduces the payoff of the punished player 
by three points. Hence, if the first party chooses the allocation ),( SPFP xx  in a game in 2P and 
the second party punishes her with 500 ≤≤ p  points, the first party’s payoff in that game is 
pxFP 3−  and the second party’s payoff is pxSP − . In 3P, if the first party chooses allocation 
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),( SPFP xx  in a game and the third party punishes her with 1p points and the second party (the 
bystander) with 2p  points ( 5021 ≤+ pp ), the payoffs in this game are 13 pxFP −  for the first 
party, 23 pxSP −  for the second party, and 21200 pp −−  for the third party. 
We ran eight sessions where we observed a total of 3100 punishment decisions. Each 
session proceeded as follows. Subjects were randomly assigned to be a first or second party (or 
third party in 3P) and anonymously matched in groups of two (in 2P) or three (in 3P). Each 
subject received instruction sheets (dependent on role and treatment) which explained the 
extensive form of the games (without giving information about the payoff constellations of the 
ten games). Subjects had to fill out control questions to make sure that they understood the 
rules. We used neutral language and avoided terms such as “punishment”. Every subject always 
played the ten games in the same role and no subject participated in both treatments. The ten 
games were presented one at a time, and the order in which they were played was randomly 
predefined for each group. At the end of each game, we asked first parties in 2P and 3P (and 
second parties in 3P) about their expectations of punishment in each allocation. Subjects were 
never told about their counterparts’ previous choices to prevent repeated game effects. After the 
subjects played the ten games, only one game was randomly selected for payment in order to 
prevent income effects.49  
In the eight sessions, we employed the strategy method to elicit the punishment behavior in 
the second stage, i.e. the subjects had to indicate for both allocations in each of the ten games 
the number of points (0–50) they wanted to assign to the other subject(s). In principle, the 
strategy method might induce a different behavior than the specific response method, where 
subjects face given, known choices for one allocation or the other.50 However, Falk et al. 
(2005) investigate this issue and find no differences in subjects’ punishment patterns, although 
the strength of punishment is somewhat lower overall with the strategy method. Thus, the 
existing evidence suggests that the strategy method does not affect the pattern of punishment, 
but might possibly lead to an under-representation of actual punishment. 
The key reason for using the strategy method was to prevent subjects from receiving any 
feedback about the first party's choices in any of the ten games, something that would lead to 
serious confounds: Punishers’ mood could change depending on the first party’s prior behavior, 
and this could generate order or history effects which would severely complicate the data 
                                                 
49 It could be argued that this dilutes monetary incentives because subjects make more decisions for the same amount 
of money. However, a meta-study by Camerer and Hogarth (1999) suggests that this is not the case. 
 
50 For other decisions than punishment, there is evidence of no systematic differences in behaviour between the 
strategy and specific response method (Cason and Mui, 1998; Brandts and Charness, 2000; Falk and Kosfeld, 2006). 
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analysis.51 In our view, the use of the strategy method seems unavoidable for the study of 
punishment behavior with a within-subjects design and a large set of games (unless the 
researcher has access to huge samples in order to control for order effects).  Additionally, it 
maximizes the amount of statistical data gathered. 
 The experiment was conducted with the Z-tree software (Fischbacher, 2007) and the 
participants were recruited with the software “ORSEE” (Greiner, 2004). 255 subjects 
participated in our experiment, 90 in 2P and 165 in 3P, that is, we observed 45 second and 55 
third parties. Most subjects were students from different disciplines of the University of Zurich 
or the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich (9 percent of them came from the faculty 
of economics and management). They earned on average 30 Swiss Francs (around $ 24) which 
included a show-up fee of 10 Swiss Francs (this fee could be accordingly reduced if one subject 
got a negative point score as a result of heavy punishment, although this never happened). The 
sessions lasted approximately 60 minutes. The instructions for both treatments are in the 
appendix in section A.2.1 and A.2.2.  
 
 
4.3 Research Hypotheses 
 
Our main research objective is determining the key forces that explain the occurrence 
(and strength) of third and second punishment. Note in this regard that, as subjects in our 
experiment get no feedback and are paid for their choices in just one game, we can analyze 
each single game as a one-shot situation. Therefore, our selection of games enables us to 
rigorously test numerous motives for the occurrence of costly punishment.52 The standard 
model assuming self-interested players predicts that neither third nor second parties should ever 
punish in any of our games. In contrast, existing models of other-regarding preferences predict 
punishment in our games under certain circumstances (we later provide a more formal 
description that includes other alternative models): 
                                                 
51 As an illustration, consider a second party who first plays against an "unkind" first party and gets angry as a result. 
This negative emotional state could affect her posterior behavior, even if the new opponent (players should be re-
matched when using the specific response method in order to prevent repeated game effects) makes a "kind" choice. 
In this regard, Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) report spillover effects when using the specific response method in their 
two treatments where participants played two games with re-matching. To keep this spillover from contaminating 
their results, they had to restrict the analysis to the games that were played first. 
 
52 Our focus in this paper is on the causes of punishment. In a companion paper, we provide a detailed analysis of 
several consequences of inequity-averse punishment, like (i) the punishment of socially efficient (or even Pareto 
efficient) choices, (ii) the sanctioning of by-standers, and (iii) the absence of punishment when absolute payoff 
equality is achieved. 
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o Inequity-aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006): A second party 
(in 2P) or a third party (in 3P) punishes in any allocation of the ten games if she gets a 
smaller payoff than another co-player and she is sufficiently averse to disadvantageous 
inequity.53    
o ERC (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000): This model makes the same predictions on the 
occurrence of punishment in 2P as inequity-aversion. In 3P, it predicts punishment of the 
first and/or the second party at any allocation if the third party can thus bring her relative 
payoff closer to 1/3, the equitable relative payoff in three-player games.  
o Reciprocity (Rabin, 1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Cox et al., 2007): A second 
party in 2P punishes if she is sufficiently reciprocal and the first party chooses the 
allocation of the game giving the second party the strictly lowest payoff –i.e. if the first 
party harmed the second party. These models predict no punishment in 3P, as the third 
party’s endowment is always 200. 
o Spite (inspired by Kirchsteiger, 1994 and Levine, 1998): Spiteful second and third parties 
should punish a co-player at all allocations.54 
o Anti-greed (inspired by Levine, 1998): A second or third party of this type punishes the 
first party if the latter chose the allocation maximizing her own money payoff, the intuition 
being that second and third parties punish selfish or greedy first parties. 
o Competitiveness (inspired by Levine, 1998): This is the opposite of inequity-aversion, that 
is, second and third parties punish in order to increase an already positive income 
difference.55 
o Efficiency (inspired by López-Pérez, 2008): A second or third party of this type punishes 
the first party if the latter chose the least efficient allocation of the game (i.e., the allocation 
with the smallest sum of payoffs); the intuition being that second and third parties punish 
deviations from a norm of social efficiency. 
o Equity (inspired by Elster, 1989 and López-Pérez, 2008): A second or third party of this 
type punishes the first party if the latter chose the least equitable allocation of the game 
(i.e., the allocation with the largest distance between players’ payoffs); the intuition being 
that second and third parties punish deviations from a norm of equity. 
                                                 
53 Of course, all the models that we cite in this section predict punishment under certain parameterizations. If the 
players differ in their parameters, therefore, only some of them might punish in our games. However, we do not need 
to be precise a priori on the distribution of parameters in the population because indeed this is part of what we aim to 
clarify with the classification analysis. 
 
54 This might seem a very stringent prediction, but recall that our experimental design was such that only one 
allocation was chosen for payment in both treatments. A spiteful type would, therefore, punish in all allocations.  
55 Although Levine allows for the existence of spiteful types that should punish indiscriminately, and estimates  that 
around 20 percent of the population correspond to this type, he suggests later that “one explanation of spite is that it 
is really “competitiveness,” that is, the desire to outdo opponents” (Levine 1998, p. 614).   
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 Table 2 presents the theoretical predictions of the models in each of our ten games for both 
third and second party punishment. In the first two columns, we can see the two allocations in 
each of the ten games. The following two columns indicate for the 2P treatment which theories 
predict punishment in the left-hand and right-hand allocation of each game. As an illustration of 
these predictions, take game 6 (280/240 vs. 390/240). An inequity-averse second party punishes 
the first party either if he chooses the left-hand or the right-hand allocation, because she always 
gets a lower payoff than him, while a reciprocal individual punishes neither allocation because 
she cannot be harmed in this game. In contrast, an individual who punishes deviations from a 
norm of equity would punish the choice of the right-hand allocation (390/240) because it is 
more inegalitarian than the alternative (280/240), and an individual who punishes deviations 
from a norm of social efficiency would punish the left-hand allocation (280/240) because the 
joint payoff is bigger in the alternative allocation (390/240). The next four columns illustrate 
the punishment predictions for 3P. We first show the punishment predictions for the first party 
and then the punishment for the bystander.56  
 In addition, the last four columns of Table 2 categorize the games according to four criteria: 
(1) JPM, i.e. whether a joint-payoff maximizing allocation exists in the respective game, (2) 
PARETO, i.e. whether a Pareto-dominant allocation exists in the respective game, (3) STRICT, 
i.e. whether a strictly equal allocation exists in the respective game and, (4) EQUITY, which 
specifies whether the party who can punish is monetarily disadvantaged by the allocation that is 
less equal. We believe that these four criteria can be important to understand punishment and 
help to omit potential biases towards certain theories. It is possible, for instance, that second 
and/or third parties are less willing to punish the choice of unequal allocations if they are 
socially or Pareto efficient: Maybe some third and/or second parties are willing to accept a 
small disadvantage for a great advantage of the other player. This seems especially plausible as 
several studies suggest that some deciders choose socially efficient allocations even at their 
own material disadvantage (Charness and Rabin 2002, Engelmann and Strobel 2004; Fehr et al. 
2006). In other words, inequity-aversion might be less influential at any social or Pareto 
efficient allocation. That STRICT is important has been suggested in abundant investigations in 
negotiation and mediation that recommend reaching strictly equal outcomes because the 
involved parties often accept them and do not want to deviate from them (e.g. Thompson 
2005). In this respect, inequity-aversion might be more influential if the game has a strictly 
equal allocation –in line with this, Güth et al. (2001) find that in ultimatum games an unfair 
                                                 
56 If a theory predicts that the third party is indifferent between punishing the first party or the by-stander at one 
allocation, we take as compatible with the theory the punishment of any of those two parties. 
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offer is more often rejected if the alternative is a strictly equal instead of a slightly unequal 
offer. The category EQUITY complements the previous category.   
 In summary, our comprehensive design allows us to discriminate between many different 
models and takes care of potential confounds. Moreover, the comparatively large number of 
games makes inferences possible with respect to how consistently individuals follow each 
behavioral rule, thus providing a stress test of models of other-regarding preferences.  
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TABLE 2― THEORETICAL PUNISHMENT PREDICTIONS AND GAME CHARACTERISTICS  
 
Game Theories predicting punishment in 2P 
Theories predicting punishment 
for the first party in 3P 
Theories predicting 
punishment for the by-stander 
in 3P 
Game Characteristics 
 Allocation Allocation Allocation Allocation JPM Pareto Strict Equity 
 Left  Right Left Right Left Right Left Right     
1 (150,150) vs. (590,60) EF, C IA, R, EQ, AG EF, C IA, EQ, AG C C yes no y y 
2 (100,100) vs. (50,530) R, EF, AG, C EQ, C EF, AG, C ERC, EQ, C C IA, ERC y n y n 
3 (560,60) vs. (120,140) IA, R, EQ, AG EF, C IA, EQ, AG EF, C C C y n n y 
4 (150,90) vs. (50,630) IA, R, EF, AG EQ, C EF, AG, C EQ, C C IA y n n n 
5 (220,260) vs. (220,400) R, EF, C EQ, C IA, ERC, EF IA,  EQ IA, ERC IA y y n n 
6 (280,240) vs. (390,240) IA, EF IA, EQ, AG IA, ERC, EF IA,  EQ, AG IA, ERC IA y y n y 
7 (250,80) vs. (80,250) IA, R, AG C IA, AG C C IA n n n - 
8 (100,100) vs. (50,150) R, AG, C EQ, C AG, C EQ, C C C n n y n 
9 (250,150) vs. (110,290) IA, R, AG EQ, C IA, AG EQ, C C IA n n n n 
10 (250,150) vs. (330,70) IA IA, R, EQ, AG IA IA, EQ, AG C C n n n y 
 IA = Inequity-aversion, R = Reciprocity, AG = Anti-Greed, EQ = Equity rule, EF = Efficiency rule, ERC = Bolton-Ockenfels (in 3P), C =Competitiveness. 
JPM = Is there a joint payoff maximizing allocation available in the respective game?  Pareto = Is there a Pareto-dominant allocation available in the respective game? Strict = Is there a strictly equal allocation 
available in the respective game?  Equity = If the less equal allocation is chosen, has the second party a lower payoff than A?         
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4.4 Experimental Results  
 
We start this section with the analysis of third and second party punishment on an aggregate 
level. While this provides first insights, the major part of this section is, however, devoted to 
the analysis of third and second party punishment on the individual level, where we present a 
classification procedure to thoroughly study the driving motivations behind third and second 
party punishment. We finish this section with an analysis and comparison of the strength of 
third and second party punishment.  
 
4.4.1. Third and Second Party Punishment: Aggregate Analysis 
We observe frequent punishment in both treatments. In 3P, 54 percent of the third parties 
punish at least once. Furthermore, third parties spend on average 12.7 points per game to 
punish, more precisely, 8.6 and 4.1 points on the first and the second party, respectively. Table 
3 summarizes the frequency and strength of third party punishment in each allocation of each 
game, distinguishing between punishment for first and second parties.  
 
Table 3― FREQUENCY AND STRENGTH OF PUNISHMENT                   
THIRD PARTIES 
    First Party Second P. (By-stander) 
Game Left Right Left Right 
1 (150,150) vs. (590,60) .06 (0.3) .44 (14.7) .09 (0.5) .04 (0.3) 
2 (100,100) vs. (50,530) .11 (2.9) .06 (0.4) .04 (0.9) .26 (9.3) 
3 (560,60) vs. (120,140) .45 (14.7) .07 (0.8) .06 (0.3) .15 (1.5) 
4 (150,90) vs. (50,630) .29 (3.8) .07 (1.2) .04 (0.7) .26 (6.9) 
5 (220,260) vs. (220,400) .24 (3.2) .09 (0.9) .13 (1.5) .22 (5.5) 
6 (280,240) vs. (390,240) .22 (3.6) .33 (7.7) .11 (0.9) .13 (1.0) 
7 (250,80) vs. (80,250) .29 (6.6) .02 (0.1) .02 (0.1) .24 (4.1) 
8 (100,100) vs. (50,150) .06 (0.4) .04 (0.5) .06 (0.4) .18 (2.0) 
9 (250,150) vs. (110,290) .26 (5.0) .06 (1.3) .02 (0.4) .22 (4.5) 
10 (250,150) vs. (330,70) .26 (5.0) .44 (12.8) .11 (0.5) .04 (0.1) 
Note:  Average points spent for punishment by all participants in parentheses. The endowment of the third party is always 200 
points. 
 
In 2P, 60 percent of the second parties punish at least once. Second parties spend on 
average 13.8 points per game to punish. Table 4 illustrates the frequency and strength of second 
party punishment in each allocation of each game. We find that the pattern of actual 
punishment is very well anticipated in 3P and 2P (recall that we elicited the punishment 
expectations of second and third parties). For instance, there are eight games in which both 
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third and second parties significantly punish the first party more strongly in one allocation 
(p<0.05; Wilcoxon-Signed Rank-Test), and this is anticipated by the first parties in each of 
these eight games (p < 0.01; Wilcoxon-Signed Rank-Test) (see also Figures A and B in the 
appendix). The behavior of the first parties in 3P and 2P, which is not the focus of our study, 
can be seen in Table A in the appendix. 
 
Table 4― FREQUENCY AND STRENGTH OF PUNISHMENT     
SECOND PARTIES 
Game Left Right 
1 (150,150)  vs. (590,60)  .02 (0.2) .42 (14.7) 
2 (100,100)  vs. (50,530) .18 (4.1) .11 (2.3) 
3 (560,60)  vs. (120,140) .31 (10.3) .13 (2.9) 
4 (150,90)  vs. (50,630) .40 (9.6) .16 (2.7) 
5 (220,260) vs. (220,400) .40 (10.6) .16 (4.0) 
6 (280,240) vs. (390,240) .31 (8.2) .36 (12.7) 
7 (250,80) vs. (80,250) .38 (9.1) .16 (2.9) 
8 (100,100) vs. (50,150) .07 (1.7) .16 (2.6) 
9 (250,150) vs. (110,290) .40 (13.6) .13 (4.0) 
10 (250,150) vs. (330,70) .31 (8.1) .47 (14.3) 
Note:  Average points spent for punishment by all participants in parentheses.  
 
 
RESULT 1: In an aggregate analysis, we observe a strong relationship between 
disadvantageous inequity and the occurrence of third party punishment. For second 
parties, we find a strong relationship between disadvantageous inequity as well as 
harm (reciprocity) and second party punishment.   
 
Evidence for Result 1: In 3P, the inequity-aversion theories of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and 
Falk and Fischbacher (2006) predict that third parties punish another player only if she gets a 
larger material payoff. This prediction can be reconciled with the data from 14 out of the 15 
allocations where a first or a second party is punished by more than 20 percent of the third 
parties (and/or their average punishment is larger than 3 points). Figure 1 illustrates the 
individual punishment decisions from the third parties who punish at least once dependent on 
the size of the payoff differences. More precisely, the horizontal axis indicates the payoff 
difference between the third and the punished party (the dashed vertical line corresponds to 
zero distance; to the right of this line the third party gets less than the punished party). The 
location of the dots indicates the number of points spent from third parties depending on the 
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distance. The size of the dots is proportional to the number of observations, i.e., given a payoff 
distance between another player and the third party, a dot becomes larger as more and more 
third parties spend the same amount to punish that player.57 We can see that payoff differences 
appear to play an important role in the decision to punish. In fact, third parties rarely punish if 
their payoff is higher than that of the first/second party, but often and severely if their payoff is 
lower.  
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Figure 1: Third Party Punishment depending on Payoff Differences
 
 Explanations other than inequity-aversion seem to play a much less important role in the 
occurrence of third party punishment. To start, note that reciprocity cannot play any role in 3P 
because the third party is unaffected by the first and second party, i.e. cannot be harmed. In 
turn, the model by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) cannot rationalize much of the observed third 
party punishment, as it predicts no punishment in games 1 (150/150 vs. 590/60), 3 (560/60 vs. 
120/140), 4 (150/90 vs. 50/630) 7 (250/80 vs. 80/250), 9 (250/150 vs. 110/290), and 10 
(250/150 vs. 330/70), where we observe considerable punishment. Spite alone (an important 
ingredient of Levine, 1998) cannot account for the high variation in the frequency of 
punishment across allocations. It also seems that third parties do not punish deviations from a 
social norm. For instance, the evidence from game 6 (280/240 vs. 390/240), where we observe 
frequent punishment of the first player in both allocations, suggests that third parties do not 
punish deviations from norms like an equity norm or a social efficiency norm. 
 In 2P, we frequently observe considerable punishment in the allocations where it is either 
predicted by inequity-aversion or reciprocity theories. In many allocations, the behavior points 
to the importance of inequity-aversion. In game 6 (280/240 vs. 390/240), for instance, about 
one third of the second parties punish the first party in either allocation, even though the first 
party’s choice did not harm them, i.e. the second party’s payoff is the same in either allocation. 
                                                 
57 If there is more than one allocation with a certain payoff difference, we weight the behavior in these allocations 
uniformly. 
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There is also considerable punishment in both allocations of game 10 (250/150 vs. 330/70), 
even when the choice (250/150) is "kind" towards the second party. However, reciprocity also 
seems important. For instance, inequity-aversion predicts that second parties should never 
punish in game 5 (220/260 vs. 220/400), while reciprocity predicts punishment in the allocation 
(220/260). Consistent with this, 40 percent of the second parties punish considerably in the 
allocation (220/260). There is also some punishment of the allocation (100/100) in game 2 
(100/100 vs. 50/530). Other explanations seem not to add much to the understanding of 
punishment in 2P (however, spite seems important to explain why there is some punishment in 
most allocations; the individual analysis will clarify this point). In fact, average punishment in 
any 2P game allocation is stronger than 4 points if and only if it is predicted by inequity-
aversion or reciprocity.58  ▪ 
 
 
4.4.2. The Occurrence of Third and Second Party Punishment: Individual 
  Analysis 
The previous section provided an aggregate and therefore rather imprecise picture of the 
motives behind third and second party punishment. We now turn to a more precise analysis on 
an individual level and provide answers to important questions like: Do third and second parties 
follow any consistent behavioral patterns? Can we classify the punishers into different types? 
Which parsimonious theory fits our data best? For this, we use the classification procedure 
from El-Gamal and Grether (1995). This procedure has the crucial advantage that it 
circumvents the multicollinearity problems that would appear in a classical regression analysis 
if the decision rules entered as independent variables. Moreover, it allows appropriate 
inferences even when testing all possible decision rules –no matter how similar their 
predictions are– at the same time.59 
 The procedure posits that third and second parties follow deterministic decision rules which 
may differ from subject to subject, but also that they tremble with probability 0>ε , in which 
case their behavior is random. By selecting the decision rule that best fits each subject’s 
behavior, we can classify subjects in types. Further, we can also find the best single decision 
rule in 2P and 3P, or the combination of two, three, etc. decision rules that best account for the 
                                                 
58 The only exception is game 8. In our companion paper we provide a possible explanation, based on the alleviating 
effect that the strict equality of payoffs has on punishment.  
 
59 Multicollinearity problems may occur as soon as decision rules share predictions in some allocations (a very 
common thing in our games). For instance, this is the case for the decision rules that predict no punishment of the 
second party in 3P and hence share predictions in 20 out of 40 allocations.  
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behavior in all ten games. Given this, we can then apply the Akaike information criterion to 
infer the number of decision rules necessary to provide a parsimonious explanation of 
punishment in our games.  
 
4.4.2.1 Decision Rules in 3P and 2P 
In this section, we specify the decision rules that we tested for 3P and 2P. For parsimony, we 
restrict our analysis to binary decision rules, that is, rules indicating only whether the subject 
punishes and not the strength of punishment. Further, we focus our attention for their particular 
interest on those binary rules that correspond to the different theories which provide a rationale 
for costly punishment.60 Although one could describe the rules for both treatments at the same 
time, we do it separately for expositional convenience; starting with the formal description of 
the 2P rules (in section 4.3 we explained the intuition behind most of these rules). 
 Since second parties in 2P make a total of 20 decisions (one for each of the two allocations 
in each of the ten games), a decision rule in 2P consists of a vector of 20 ones and zeros: It 
takes value one if the rule predicts punishment at the corresponding allocation and zero if it 
predicts no punishment. Thus, there are in principle 220 possible binary decision rules in 2P. For 
simplicity, however, we focus on nine decision rules in 2P. Letting ),( LSP
L
FP xx  refer to the 
left-hand and ),( RSP
R
FP xx  to the right-hand allocation at any game (with FP denoting first 
party and SP denoting second party), they are defined as follows: (1) the “selfish” rule consists 
of a vector of 20 zeros and predicts never punishment, (2) the “inequity-aversion” rule predicts 
punishment only at those allocations where iSP
i
FP xx > , for ),( RLi = , (3) the “reciprocity” 
rule predicts punishment at any allocation ),( RLj =  such that iSPjSP xx <   )( ij ≠ , (4) the 
“spite” rule consists of a vector of 20 ones, (5) the “anti-greed” rule predicts punishment if 
j
FP
i
FP xx > , for ),( RLi = , (6) the “efficiency” rule predicts punishment in allocation 
),( jSP
j
FP xx  only if 
i
SP
i
FP
j
SP
j
FP xxxx +<+  )( ij ≠ , (7) the “equity” rule predicts punishment 
in allocation ),( jSP
j
FP xx  only if 
i
SP
i
FP
j
SP
j
FP xxxx −<−  )( ij ≠ , (8) the “maximin” rule 
(inspired by Charness and Rabin, 2002) predicts punishment in allocation ),( jSP
j
FP xx  only if 
                                                 
60 We do not report the complete analysis here. For instance, we tested a large number of “hybrid” decision rules like 
an “inequity-aversion and reciprocity” rule. Including such “hybrid” rules did not significantly improve the model. 
The results are available upon request. 
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},min{},min{ iSP
i
FP
j
SP
j
FP xxxx <  )( ij ≠ ,61 and (9) the ‘competitiveness’ rule  predicts 
punishment at those allocations where iSP
i
FP xx ≤ . Table 2 in section 4.3 indicates the 
predictions of some 2P rules (and some 3P ones) in our ten games.  
 In 3P, third parties make two different punishment decisions in each of the 20 allocations 
(they can punish the first and/or the second party). Therefore, decision rules in 3P consist of 
vectors of 40 ones and zeros. We focus on thirteen decision rules, which correspond to existing 
theoretical approaches. The first eight of them are based on the 2P rules mentioned above: (1) 
The “selfish” rule consists of a vector of 40 zeros, (2) the “inequity-aversion” rule is a logical 
extension of the inequity-aversion rule in 2P predicting punishment of the first and/or second 
party when they have a larger payoff than the third party, (3) the “spite” rule is a vector of 40 
ones, the (4) “anti-greed”, (5) “efficiency”, (6) “equity” and (7) “maximin” rules are defined 
like in 2P (they never predict punishment of the second party in 3P), and (8) the 
“competitiveness” rule predicts punishment of the first and/or second party when they have a 
smaller payoff than the third party.62 Further, (9) the “ERC” rule (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) 
predicts punishment of the first and/or the second party in allocation )200,,( jSP
j
FP xx  if 
600400 <+< jSPjFP xx , i.e., if the third party can use punishment to bring her relative payoff 
closer to 1/3, the equitable relative payoff in three-player games.63 Finally, we include some 
rules for third parties that are based on the ideas of inequity-aversion and reciprocity; this will 
allow us to investigate if third parties have different motivations than second parties. They are 
(10) the “indirect reciprocity” rule (inspired by Nowak and Sigmund, 2005 and Seinen and 
Schram, 2006) predicting punishment of the first party if iSP
j
SP xx <  )( ij ≠  and no punishment 
of the second party, (11) an “envy-active” rule predicting punishment of the first party in the 
same conditions as the inequity-aversion rule, but no punishment of the second party, i.e. 
people who follow this rule punish richer players only if they are responsible for the outcome, 
                                                 
61 In other words, this rule predicts punishment for the first party if she does not choose the maximin allocation, 
maybe because that constitutes a "maximin norm" transgression. Charness and Rabin (2002) report that dictators are 
often willing to sacrifice part of their material payoff in order to increase the payoff of all recipients, especially of 
those with low-payoffs.  
 
62 We do not include a reciprocity rule because it predicts no punishment in the 3P treatment and hence coincides 
with the selfish rule. 
63 To see this, let 200++= jSPjFP xxσ  denote the sum of players’ payoffs and hence 200/σ denote the third 
party’s relative payoff, and note that (i) this relative payoff is smaller than 1/3 if jSP
j
FP xx +<400 , and (ii) a 
unit of punishment increases the relative payoff if 60080020013
1200 <+⇔>⇔>−− − jSPjFP xxσσσ . Note that 
we do not include an ERC rule in our analysis of second party punishment because it shares predictions with the 
inequity aversion rule. 
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(12) an “egalitarian” rule (Dawes et al., 2007) that predicts punishment (in our games) of those 
co-players getting a payoff larger than the average one,64 and finally, (13) the “envy-
perspective” rule predicting punishment of the first party if iSP
i
FP xx > , and no punishment of 
the second party (third parties who follow this rule put themselves in the shoes of an inequity-
averse second party).  
 
4.4.2.2 Estimation of the Error Rate  
The classification procedure posits that each subject follows one of the above mentioned 
decision rules but allows for mistakes. More precisely, subjects may tremble in each allocation 
with probability 0>ε , in which case it is assumed that they randomize with equal probability 
between punishing or not punishing.65 Consequently, the probability that a subject s deviates 
from her rule at any allocation is 2
ε , while the probability of observing her actual behavior -
assume that she follows her rule sX  times out of her d choices (20 in 2P, 40 in 3P)- is:  
                      
ss XdX −×− )
2
()
2
1( εε   .66 
To find the maximum likelihood estimate εˆ  of the error rate, consider first the simplest case: 
All subjects follow the same decision rule. In that case, εˆ  maximizes the overall likelihood 
across all n players 
              ∏
=
−×−
n
s
XdX ss
1
)
2
()
2
1(max εε .      (1) 
One can then prove by applying standard optimization techniques (consult the appendix) that εˆ  
coincides with twice the proportion of overall deviations, that is, 
                                                 
64 More generally, this motive predicts punishment if that reduces the standard deviation from the group mean. This 
coincides with inequity aversion in two-player games and in many three-player games. In our 3P games, inequity 
aversion and the egalitarian motive can be discriminated in game 8. While inequity-averse third parties should not 
damage the bystander in the allocation (50/150), third parties following the egalitarian rule should do so. We find 
some support for the egalitarian rule since 18 percent damage the bystander then. However, in the classification 
analysis for third parties the inequity aversion rule outperforms the egalitarian rule.  
 
65 To simplify the analysis, we assume that all subjects tremble with the same probability in any allocation. This is 
probably a realistic assumption in view that the punishers’ decision problem is, from a strategic point of view, 
undemanding, so that no change of ε  through time (due to learning effects) should be expected. 
 
66 In computing this, we posit that choices across allocations and games are independent –i.e., the probability of 
following the rule at any allocation does not depend on what the subjects did before. This seems reasonable in our 
experiment because (1) subjects are given no feedback and hence there appears to be no reason for changes in mood, 
and (2) since the punisher’s decision problem is arguably easy, we do not expect any learning effects. 
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−×⋅
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εˆ .        (2) 
By computing εˆ  for every possible rule of each treatment, we can then find the optimal 
decision rule in the maximum likelihood sense, i.e. that maximizing function (1) given the data. 
This procedure can be extended to the case where different agents use different rules. If we 
assume that there are two types of players, for instance, we can find the optimal pair of rules by 
applying the following three-step algorithm to any pair of possible rules A and B: (a) We assign 
each individual s to the rule that minimizes the number of actual deviations sXd −  (in case 
of a tie, we assign "half" of an individual to each rule), (b) we use expression (2) and the 
experimental data to find εˆ , and (c) we compute the probability that our data has been 
generated by the partition of the players generated in step (a), that is,        
    ∏∏
∈
−
∈
− ×−⋅×−
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XdX
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XdX jjii )
2
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2
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2
()
2
1( εεεε  .     (3) 
The optimal pair of rules maximizes equation (3). Finally, if we assume that our subject pool 
follows three or more rules, the procedure applies analogously.  
 
 
4.4.2.3 Results of the Classification Procedure 
Tables 5 and 6 summarize the results of the classification procedure in 2P and 3P. The second 
column in each table indicates the best single rule in that treatment, the best pair of rules, and 
so on. The third column indicates the percentage of second and third parties that follow each 
rule. The fourth column reports the estimated error εˆ  - recall that the probability that a subject 
deviates from her rule at any allocation is equal to 2
εˆ . Note in this regard that the success of 
our model (measured by how small εˆ  is) increases as the number of rules k increases. This is 
intuitive as the overall likelihood (3) increases as k increases.67 However, our model also 
becomes more complex as k increases and hence it would be desirable to introduce a penalty 
for allowing "too many" decision rules. To provide an indication of the optimal number of rules 
in each treatment, the fifth column of each table reports the log-likelihood – for the best two 
                                                 
67 The same logic applies here as in a linear regression model, where the coefficient of determination R
2
 increases 
with the number of independent variables. 
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rules, for instance, this is the log value of (3) – less the number of parameters (d + n)·k.68 
According to the Akaike information criterion (AIC), the optimal model should maximize this 
number. Finally, the sixth column of each table reports the results from a likelihood ratio test of 
goodness of fit, described later.  
 
TABLE 5― RESULTS OF CLASSIFICATION PROCEDURE IN 3P 
(THIRD PARTIES) 
Number of 
rules   Rule(s) chosen 
Percentage of third 
parties  ε AIC 
Chi-squared 
(p-Value) 
1 selfish 100% 0.309 -1042.2  
2 selfish, inequity-aversion 78%, 22% 0.182 -862.5 549.31 (0) 
3 selfish, inequity-aversion, envy- perspective 66%, 20%, 14% 0.162 -905.6 653.08 (0) 
4 selfish, inequity-aversion, envy- perspective, spite 66%, 16%, 14%, 4% 0.151 -971 712.24 (0) 
 
RESULT 2: A combination of inequity-averse and selfish types can sufficiently capture third 
parties’ punishment patterns. If we allow for more complexity, a combination of two different 
inequity-averse types, selfish and spiteful types best explains the third parties’ punishment 
pattern. 
 
Evidence for Result 2: As Table 5 shows, the classification procedure detects the following 
behavioral patterns for third parties: (1) if we force the algorithm to choose only one rule, the 
selfish rule is picked. A large number of subjects never punish and hence the selfish rule fits 
their behavior perfectly, and the error rate is already considerably small (0.309 in 3P). The error 
rates of all other rules are at least twice as high (e.g. inequity-aversion rule: 0.769, envy-
perspective rule: 0.667, spite rule: 1). (2) If we force the algorithm to choose the best pair of 
rules, it selects the selfish rule together with the inequity-aversion rule. Then 22 percent of the 
third parties are classified as inequity-averse and the error rate drops to 18.2 percent.69 (3) 
Adding a third rule is suboptimal according to the AIC, which suggests that the assumption that 
there are just selfish and inequity-averse types can sufficiently capture the punishment pattern 
                                                 
68 In a model with k rules, we must first estimate each rule, which consists of d zeros and ones (hence the number 
d·k) and moreover we have to find the rule each subject follows or those he or she does not follow (hence the 
number n·k). 
 
69 In comparison, El-Gamal and Grether (1995) study decisions under uncertainty and find an error rate of 0.312 
when looking for the best pair of decision rules.  
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in 3P. (4) If we nevertheless add a third rule, the algorithm picks the envy-perspective rule. (5) 
If we add a fourth rule, spite is chosen. ▪ 
 Although the AIC recommends not introducing a third rule if parsimony is our main goal, 
the comparatively good performance of the envy-perspective rule is an illustration of how this 
classification procedure can be used to provide new intuitions on punishment.70 From our 
knowledge, no experimental paper has provided evidence on this rule before. We speculate that 
the third parties who follow this rule might be motivated to alleviate the distress of the poorest, 
weakest party in case that party cannot defend herself (i.e., if she is passive). More 
experimental evidence, in any case, is required for a better understanding of this kind of 
behavior. 
 
RESULT 3: A combination of inequity-averse and selfish types can sufficiently capture second 
parties’ punishment patterns. If we allow for more complexity, a combination of inequity-
averse, selfish, spiteful and reciprocal types best explains second parties’ punishment patterns. 
 
Evidence for Result 3: Table 6 indicates the following behavioral patterns for second parties: 
(1) If we force the algorithm to choose only one rule, the selfish rule is picked. This happens 
because a large number of subjects never punish and hence the selfish rule fits their behavior 
perfectly. The error rate of 0.502 is therefore quite small compared to that of other rules. The 
second lowest error rate comes from the inequity-aversion rule which is 0.731, the error rate of 
the reciprocity rule is 0.798, and the error rate of any other rule is 1. (2) If we force the 
algorithm to choose the best pair of rules, it selects the selfish rule together with the inequity- 
aversion rule. We can also see that a considerable fraction of 42 percent is then best classified 
as inequity-averse. Moreover, we observe that when using these two rules, the error rate is 
rather low (29 percent). (3) Adding a third rule is suboptimal according to the Akaike 
information criterion, which suggests that the punishment pattern of second parties can be 
sufficiently captured by the assumption that there are just selfish and inequity-averse types. (4) 
However, if we add a third rule, the algorithm picks the spite rule, and 29 percent of the second 
parties are now classified as inequity-averse and 13 percent as spiteful. (5) If we add a fourth 
rule, reciprocity is chosen. ▪ 
 
                                                 
70 Subjects following this rule punish as an inequity-averse second party would do in 2P. For this reason, one might 
be tempted to think that they just misunderstood the experimental instructions and thought that they were second 
parties. This is very unlikely, though, as their screens always indicated that they were third parties and they had to 
indicate their punishment for the first and the second party at each allocation.  
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TABLE 6― RESULTS OF CLASSIFICATION PROCEDURE IN 2P 
(SECOND PARTIES) 
Number of 
rules   Rule(s) chosen 
Percentage of second 
parties ε AIC 
Chi-squared 
(p-Value) 
1 selfish 100% 0.502 -572.2  
2 selfish, inequity-aversion 58%, 42% 0.290 -503.4 267.52 (0) 
3 selfish, inequity-aversion, spite 58%, 29%, 13% 0.220 -506.9 390.66 (0) 
4 selfish, inequity-aversion, spite, reciprocity 53%, 22%, 13%, 11% 0.193 -545.9 442.58 (0) 
 
We note that the results of our classification analysis are in line with Charness and Rabin 
(2002, p. 838) who suggest that, considering distributional preferences alone (i.e., no 
reciprocity) and when no self-interest is at stake, approximately 20 percent of their observed 
behavior can be attributed to difference (i.e., inequity) aversion and 10 percent to spite.71 
Further, and although Dawes et al. (2007) and Falk at al. (2005) do not perform any 
classification analysis, they cite some behaviors that seem to be explainable only by spite and 
which have a frequency in line with our previous results. Thus, around 15 percent of the 
participants in one treatment of Falk at al. (2005) defected and punished other players in a 
Prisoner’s Dilemma with a punishment stage (the authors also show that this kind of 
punishment is very sensitive to its cost; the result that we have just cited corresponds to a 
punishment technology that is similar to the one available in our experiment). 
Observe that the Akaike criterion suggests in both treatments that a model with two, three 
or four rules is better than one with just one single rule. To further clarify this point, we 
performed a likelihood ratio test to contrast the null hypothesis that a restricted model with only 
one rule fits the data similarly well as an unrestricted model with 2, 3, and 4 rules. From the 
table, we see that we always very strongly reject the null hypothesis.72 
To sum up, our classification analysis shows that a model assuming two types of players 
(selfish and inequity-averse) best explains the occurrence of punishment in our two treatments, 
while alternative and equally parsimonious models perform worse. This does not mean, of 
course, that inequity-aversion can account for the occurrence of all punishment in our games: 
As we have seen in section 4.4.1, reciprocity plays also an important role in 2P, and other 
minor variables like spite affect third and second party punishment. Further, the fact that the 
                                                 
71 Note: Charness and Rabin (2002, p. 823) use the term ‘competitive preferences’ to refer to what we call ‘spite’.  
 
72 Since negative twice the log-likelihood ratio is asymptotically distributed as chi-squared with degrees of freedom 
equal to the number of restrictions, large values of the chi-squared statistic reject the null hypothesis. Note that the 
number of restrictions is d, 2d, and 3d as we restrict 1, 2, and 3 rules, respectively, to coincide with another rule. 
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error rate ε is never zero indicates that many punishers do not follow strictly a simple decision 
rule, but take several factors into account when deciding whether to punish.  
 
4.4.3 The Strength of Third and Second Party Punishment 
The disadvantage of the classification procedure is that, due to complexity, it makes more sense 
to investigate the occurrence of punishment only and abstract from its strength. While this is 
not a problem when testing most theoretical models, we may lose some information concerning 
models of inequity-aversion and reciprocity which respectively forecast a positive relation 
between the strength of punishment and the difference in payoffs and the size of the harm, i.e. 
the net payoff loss of the second party. We first take a look at third parties. A Tobit analysis 
shows that their average punishment significantly (p < 0.001) increases by 7.24 (3.65) points 
when the difference in payoffs between the first (second) and the third party increases by 100 
points (recall that each point spent reduces the payoff of the punished party by 3 points).73 That 
is, the bigger the difference in payoffs, the more the third party punishes the first and second 
parties. 
 In turn, table 7 shows the results of three Tobit regressions that show whether the difference 
in payoffs and the size or existence of harm predict the strength of second party punishment. 
Column (1) reports that, considered in isolation, the difference in payoffs and the size of harm 
both predict the strength of punishment as suggested, but also that the coefficient for the 
difference in payoffs is more robust and twice as large as the coefficient for the size of harm. 
The coefficient of 0.0293 for difference in payoffs means that second parties spend on average 
0.0293 points for a payoff disadvantage of one point, i.e. 2.93 points for a payoff disadvantage 
of 100 points. In column (2), we use the difference in payoffs and the size of harm at the same 
time in one regression. We can see that when controlling for the difference in payoffs, the size 
of the harm becomes insignificant. The coefficient for the difference in payoffs remains 
substantial; the amount of points spent by second parties to punish first parties increases by an 
average of 2.79 points when the payoff disadvantage increases by 100 points. We also 
investigate the effect of the sole existence of harm by itself. In column (1), we see that the 
dummy for the existence of harm is a highly significant predictor for the size of punishment 
when considered in isolation. Second parties are willing to spend 9.58 additional points to 
punish if they have been harmed. Further, column (3) indicates that the existence of harm alone 
is also important when we control for the difference in payoffs: The existence of harm then 
increases punishment by 6.98 points. In summary, subjects punish more if they have been 
                                                 
73 We use a Tobit regression since players could maximally spend 50 points to punish and many players spent 50 
points. An OLS regression analysis leads to very similar results.  
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harmed, but apparently they do not increase the punishment the more they have been harmed. 
This leads us to our next result. 
 
TABLE 7―DETERMINANTS OF SECOND PARTY 
PUNISHMENT (Tobit)  
Dependent Variable Strength of Punishment for the First Party 
Column (1) (2) (3) 
Difference in payoffs  0.0293***      (0.0062) 
0.0279***       
(0.0062) 
0.0165***        
(0.0048) 
Size of Harm 0.0138**       (0.0058) 
0.0039          
(0.0058)  
Existence of Harm 9.5813***      (2.6488)   
6.9828***        
(2.6795) 
 Notes: 540 Observations. Data comes from all 27 second parties that punish at least 
once. Data is clustered on individual level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 58 
observations are right-censored at punishment = 50 points. Notes: *** 99-percent 
significance, ** 98-percent significance, * 95-percent significance.   
 
RESULT 4: Models that combine envious with reciprocal motives, like Falk and Fischbacher 
(2006), perform well in predicting the strength of second and third party punishment. 
 
Evidence for Result 4: The predictions in column (3) are very much in line with Falk and 
Fischbacher (2006), who predict a relatively more intense punishment of a "richer" first party if 
she has also harmed the second party (independently on the amount of harm inflicted). We 
observe further support for their theory when comparing games 9 (250/150 vs. 110/290) and 10 
(250/150 vs. 330/70). In both games, the first party can choose the allocation (250/150) and this 
choice leaves the second party in a disadvantageous position (hence some punishment is 
predicted). In addition, the choice for (250/150) "harms" the second party in game 9, where the 
alternative allocation is (110/290) but not in game 10 where the alternative is (330/70). As a 
result, Falk and Fischbacher predict less punishment by second parties of the choice (250/150) 
in game 10, a prediction which is supported by our data (Wilcoxon-Signed Rank Test, z=2.168, 
p=0.030).74 ▪ 
 
 
 
                                                 
74 We make two remarks in this regard. First, this characteristic of the model is immaterial in the 3P treatment 
because third parties are never harmed by any other party. Second, a slightly different version of the model 
(appendix A of Falk and Fischbacher, 2006) predicts a relatively more intense punishment of a richer first party who 
harmed the second party only if the first party is richer than the second party in the alternative allocation. This 
version thus predicts equal punishment of allocation 250/150 in games 9 and 10, which is not consistent with our 
data. 
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4.4.4 Comparing the Strength of Third and Second Party Punishment 
 
RESULT 5: Third party punishment is not generally weaker than second party punishment. 
Yet, third parties appear to punish more selectively and are especially likely to spend money 
when their opponents are richer. 
 
Evidence for Result 5: If we compare how many points third and second parties spend in total, 
we find no differences (Mann-Whitney Test, z=0.608, p=0.543). This can be explained by two 
facts: (i) third parties are more sensitive to payoff differences – i.e. they punish a difference of 
100 points more than twice as strongly (see section 4.4.3), and, (ii) third parties spend part of 
their money to punish bystanders. Thus, if we only look at the punishment of the first party, we 
observe that third parties spend overall less points than second parties (Mann-Whitney Test, 
z=3.209, p=0.001). For a more detailed analysis, figure 2 breaks down what happens in each 
game. The dots (squares) indicate the average punishment of third (second) parties for the first 
party in the left- and right-hand allocation in each of the ten games (e.g. 3L = game 3, left-hand 
allocation) –further, a solid (dotted) line connects the second (third) party observations.75 Note 
that the punishment pattern of third and second parties in figure 2 is accurately anticipated by 
their co-players - figures A and B in the appendix illustrate the average expectation of 
punishment in each allocation in 3P and 2P. Furthermore, figure 2 illustrates two important 
findings.  
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Figure 2: Average Second and Third Party Punishment in all 10 Games
 
                                                 
75 Note that we connected the points in figure 2 just for illustrative reasons. In particular, this does not suggest a 
temporal ordering. As explained in the experimental design section, the games were played in random order. 
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 First, the solid line lies below the dotted line in most allocations, which indicates that third 
parties tend to punish the first parties more weakly than the second parties. However, the 
differences are significant only in 4 of the 20 allocations (Mann-Whitney Test on a 10 percent 
level: game 5 and 9 left, game 7 and 8 right). For instance, hardly any third party punishes in 
the allocations (80/250) in game 7 and in (50/150) in game 8 (2 and 4 percent), whereas 16 
percent of the second parties punish in these two allocations. Further, only 24 and 26 percent of 
the third parties punish in the allocations (220/260) in game 5 and (250/150) in game 9 
compared to 40 percent of the second parties. These significant differences can be attributed to 
three reasons: (i) Second parties punish more if they have been harmed, as it happens in these 
allocations, (ii) second parties tend to be more spiteful than third parties, as our previous 
classification of third and second parties indicated, and (iii) because payoff differences between 
first and third parties are rather small in these allocations. Second, the figure reveals that third 
party punishment can be as intense as that from second parties. Remarkably, there are no 
differences in the allocations that are punished strongest on average (game 1 right:    z=-0.054, 
p=0.956, game 10 right: z=0.327, p=0.743). In the left-hand allocation of game 3, third party 
punishment is even slightly stronger (z=-1.382, p=0.167). These three allocations have in 
common that the first party has an income that lies well above the income of the other parties. 
Hence if large payoff differences exist in our games, second and third parties are equally 
willing to punish, even if the second party has been harmed. ▪ 
 
RESULT 6: Third party punishment very closely resembles second party punishment, which 
implies that third parties do not act more normatively and impartially than second parties. 
  
Evidence for Result 6: Figure 2 also illustrates that the pattern of second and third party 
punishment is identical in all of the ten games. Always, when the second party punished one 
allocation significantly more strongly than the alternative (which is the case in eight of the ten 
games), the third party behaved accordingly and punished the same allocation more strongly. 
This is also the case for third parties in the two remaining games, where second parties punish 
both allocations approximately equally. This latter fact provides additional evidence that third 
parties do not punish deviations from a norm of equity, efficiency, or maximin (otherwise they 
would not punish both choices), something supported as well by the classification analysis in 
section 4.4.2.3.  
 In addition, the overall similarity in punishment sheds doubt on the assumption that third 
parties are more impartial and suffer less from an egocentric bias because of their unaffected 
position in the game (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004). The behavior in game 7 (250/80 vs. 80/250) 
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also speaks against this assumption. Observe that both allocations in this game are symmetric – 
i.e., a permutation of each other – so that one should expect that an "impartial" party who 
uniformly values each player's welfare regards both allocations as equally fair and punish them 
less than a second party.76 Contrary to this, we observe that both second and third parties 
punish the first party equally strongly for choosing the allocation (250/80) (Mann-Whitney 
Test, z=0.954, p=0.340). ▪ 
 To finish, we address two possible objections to our claim that punishment from third 
parties is not generally weaker than punishment from second parties. First, one might argue 
that this is an artifact of our setting because second parties have a lower endowment in 
comparison to third parties in some allocations (regardless of the punishment technology which 
is the same for third and second parties in all allocations). Indeed, if the marginal utility of 
money is decreasing in our games, parties with a small endowment should be relatively more 
reluctant to spend money from their already low endowment. Second, the use of the strategy 
method might have an asymmetric effect on the strength of punishment from third and second 
parties. In principle, a “hotter” environment induced for instance by the specific response 
method could increase the strength of punishment from second parties (as in Falk et al., 2005) 
but not from third parties (since they are unaffected, their reactions might be more independent 
of the environment).  
 We can exclude the first objection in our games. Second parties are not more reluctant to 
spend money if their balance is low. In a Tobit regression analysis, where we use the size of the 
payoff differences and the endowment of the second party to predict the strength of the 
punishment in all the cases where the second party endowment is lower than the third party 
endowment (< 200 points), we find that the second party endowment is an uninformative 
variable (t=-0.63, p=0.527). In fact, second parties punish especially in games 1, 3 and 10, 
where their balance is lowest. In summary, the intensity of punishment in our games does not 
decrease when second parties have a lower balance than third parties.  
 To address the second objection, we conducted an additional experiment in which both third 
and second parties played only one of our games, now using the specific-response method. We 
chose game 1 (150/150 vs. 590/60) because we expected a large amount of punishment from 
our results and also because third and second parties punished the allocation (590/60) equally 
strongly. The experiment was conducted in Madrid in different university classes, with subjects 
                                                 
76 We add two remarks. First, in the literature on Welfare Economics, a social welfare function W is said to be 
symmetric if W(u) = W(u’) whenever the utility vector u constitutes a permutation of vector u’. We have this idea in 
mind when we refer to impartiality. Second, an impartial spectator might still consider the choice of allocation 
(250/80) unfair because it fails to be courteous –i.e., that choice signals that the first party cares more for herself than 
for the second party. Recall, however, that the classification analysis does not find evidence in favor of this anti-
greedy behavior. 
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from different disciplines (60 subjects participated in the 2P and 75 subjects in the 3P 
treatment).77 Our data shows that when comparing the behavior of the strategy method with the 
specific response method, neither second parties nor third parties punish the choice of the 
allocation (590/60) significantly stronger when using the specific response method (in 3P: z=-
1.544, p=0.123); in fact, second parties punish even slightly less when using the specific 
response method (in 2P: z=1.857, p=0.063). Therefore, this seems to contradict the idea that the 
specific response method fosters second but not third party punishment in our games.  
 
 
4.5 Conclusion  
 
We investigate third and second party punishment in a set of ten different games to find out 
more about the individual motivations behind both types of punishment and to provide insights 
into the different existing theoretical approaches. The results suggest that inequity-aversion is 
the crucial (although not the only) cause of third and second party punishment. Our data also 
shows that third parties do not act more “normatively” or less egocentrically than second 
parties, casting doubt on the idea that third parties are more impartial. 
 The evidence from our experiment has implications for the different theoretical models. To 
start, pure reciprocity models like Rabin (1993), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), and Cox 
et al. (2007) fail to account for third party punishment. For this reason, we believe that 
reciprocity alone should not be applied to explain punishment. In contrast, inequity-aversion 
models like Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Falk and Fischbacher (2006) fare much better in 
explaining the occurrence of punishment in 3P and give also rather good predictions in 2P. 
These models (especially Falk and Fischbacher, 2006) are also more accurate in predicting the 
strength of punishment. Levine (1998) is inconsistent with the heavy punishment of socially 
and Pareto efficient actions, and with the role that strict equality plays in reducing punishment 
(reciprocity also faces this problem). In turn, norm approaches face an unanticipated problem in 
2P and 3P: There seems to be no way to explain punishers’ choices as a reaction to a prior 
deviation from any sensible norm of distributive justice (taking standard concepts like social 
efficiency, equity, or maximin into account). A clear illustration of this is that both allocations 
are punished in some games or that bystanders are damaged by third parties. Indeed, our data 
indicates that third party punishment is not more "normative". This is not to say, though, that 
norms are unimportant in explaining punishment, as many third and second parties (even if 
                                                 
77 The experimental protocol and the instructions were as similar as possible to those of the Zurich sessions. More 
information on this experiment is available upon request.  
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inequity-averse) might rationalize their punishment as a reaction to a prior violation of a norm, 
as the classical philosopher Seneca noted: “Reason wishes the decision that it gives to be just; 
anger wishes to have the decision which it has given seem the just decision”. People might not 
punish normatively, but they are likely to believe that they do so. 
 The results from our classification analysis can be used for predictive purposes. For 
example, it is a very natural question how a change in the third party endowment could affect 
punishment. In this regard, our analysis suggests that one group of third parties (the inequity- 
averse) will probably stop punishing if their endowment rises enough, that is, if they are richer 
than the other parties. In contrast, other groups (the envy-perspective and spiteful ones) might 
punish even if they are richer than the other parties (the envy-perspective group would punish 
only if the first party is richer than the second party). Our evidence provides support in this 
regard, as we observe less, albeit still some punishment in those allocations where the third 
party is richer than their co-players (as in some allocations in games 1, 2, 3, 4, and 8), 
especially if in addition the first party is richer than the second party; 29 percent of the third 
parties punish the first party if she chooses allocation (150, 90) in game 4. 
 We finish with some possible ideas for future research. First, all the models we have 
considered deal exclusively with monetary punishment. Hence, none of them is consistent with 
the idea that people can punish others by non-monetary means (insults, humiliating speech, 
etc). When do second and third parties use this kind of sanctions and when are they useful in 
preventing undesirable behavior? Second, since our main objective in this paper was studying 
and comparing the motives for second and third party punishment, our games have just one 
sanctioning party. However, it could be interesting to study what happens when there are 
multiple third parties who can punish, as they might be less willing to punish, on the idea that 
"others will do it" – this could have to do with the phenomenon of responsibility alleviation 
reported in Charness (2000). Finally, Falk et al. (2005) report that some defectors in a 
prisoner’s dilemma punish other players, in particular when the cost of sanctioning is cheap. 
This correlation between punishment and its cost is not as pronounced for the punishment of 
defectors by cooperators, and suggests that some type of punishment (spiteful?) is more 
sensitive to its cost than others (envious, reciprocal?), a topic that deserves also further study.  
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4.A.1  Appendix Tables and Figures 
 
TABLE A―OBSERVED FREQUENCIES OF CHOICES 
FROM FIRST PARTIES IN 2P & 3P 
Game Left Right 
    2P 3P 2P 3P 
1 (150,150) vs. (590,60) .09 .11 .91 .89 
2 (100,100) vs. (50,530) .80 .82 .20 .18 
3 (560,60) vs. (120,140) 1 .98 0 .02 
4 (150,90) vs. (50,630) .73 .87 .27 .13 
5 (220,260) vs. (220,400) .20 .18 .80 .82 
6 (280,240) vs. (390,240) .13 .07 .87 .93 
7 (250,80) vs. (80,250) 1 1 0 0 
8 (100,100) vs. (50,150) .96 1 .04 0 
9 (250,150) vs. (110,290) .93 .96 .07 .04 
10 (250,150) vs. (330,70) .40 .18 .60 .82 
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4.A.2 Appendix: Derivation of the maximum likelihood estimate of .ε  
 
We obtain εˆ  by solving the following maximization problem (assuming that an interior 
solution ( )1,0ˆ∈ε exists) 
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Computing the first derivative of (1) and after some algebra, one gets the first order condition 
of problem (1), that is,  
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, it follows that indeed (2) is a maximum. Finally, and in case 
expression (2) takes a value equal or larger than 1 so that an interior solution does not exist, the 
optimum is clearly 1ˆ =ε .  
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Appendix: Experimental Instructions 
 
 
 
 
 
Content of Appendix 
 
In the following I document the English translation for the instructions in Chapter 2, 3 and 4. 
The experiments in Chapter 2 and 3 were conducted in Brazil and are translated from 
Portuguese. The instructions for the experiments were presented orally and participants did not 
receive written instructions. The experiments in Chapter 4 were conducted in Switzerland and 
Spain and the participants received written instructions. For the experiments in Chapter 4, I 
only provide the instructions for the Swiss sessions and for one role because the instructions for 
the Spanish sessions and for the different roles are very similar. The complete set of 
instructions is available upon request.  
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A.1 Instructions for Laboratory Experiments in Brazil (Chapter 2 & 3) 
 
A1.1 Instructions for Laboratory Experiments in 2008 
Thank you for coming to today’s meeting. Please note that you are free to leave this meeting at 
any point of time. Today’s meeting starts with several games. Thereafter, there will be a survey. 
During the games, you will have the possibility to earn money. The money you earn will be 
paid out at the end of the meeting. Nobody besides me will know what you will earn today. The 
payment will be private. You should know that the money comes from research funds and not 
from our own pockets or from the pocket of politicians. Please note, that there is no right or 
wrong in playing the games, this is not a test. During today’s session you will receive a code. 
This ensures that everything you do – your decisions in the games and your answers in 
questionnaires – will remain anonymously.  
 
(Time Preference Experiment, Chapter 2) Before we start, here are two pralines. Please take 
them. Do you like them? Do you want these two pralines now or do you prefer to wait until the 
end of today’s meeting and receive three instead of two pralines? 
 
We will now play 5 different games. You will be paid according to the outcome from two of 
the five games. But you will only know after you played all five games for which of the two 
games you will be paid. After you have played all 5 games, you will draw two cards and the 
cards will determine which two games will be relevant for payment. This means that you 
should take your decisions in all five games seriously because there is very high chance that 
one game will become relevant for your payment. During the five games, we will speak of 
points. 1 Point is worth 1 Real in the two games that will be chosen for payment. In the other 
three games, the points will be not converted to Reais.  
 
This is game 1 (Donation Experiment, not reported in Chapter 2 and 3). 
I will now give you two envelopes. In the one envelope for you are 10 points, in the other are 
no points. Your decision is the following: You decide how many of the 10 points you take out 
of your envelope and transfer to the other. Each point that you transfer from your envelope to 
the other envelope will be donated to an orphanage. Thus, the more points you take out of your 
envelope, the less you have, but the more points the orphanage receives. Let me give you two 
examples: You transfer 9 points; this means you will receive 1 point and the orphanage 9 
points. Or, you transfer 3 points which means you will receive 7 points and the orphanage will 
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get 3 points. Of course you can transfer as many of the 10 points as you want, that is, from zero 
to ten points. 
 
Do you understand? While you make your decision, I will turn my back. Please do not tell me 
what you plan to do. Please decide now and transfer the amount of points from this envelope to 
the other envelope and then put the two envelopes in the box in front of you. Tell me when you 
are ready!  
  
Let's move on to game 2 (Risk-aversion Experiment, Chapter 3). 
I will now give you 10 points. They are yours. If this game is one of the two games selected for 
payment, it would mean that you get 10 Reais. You can play with these points, however, 
playing is risky: you can multiply these points or lose them. This depends on this coin. You 
will throw this coin and choose head or tail. If you choose head and head shows up, the points 
you decided to play with are multiplied by 2.5. If you choose head and tail shows up, you will 
lose all points you decided to play with. You can decide not to play or to play with 1 – 10 
points. Let me give you an example: I decide to play with 5 points, which means that I have 5 
points for certain. Then I will choose head or tail and afterwards I will throw the coin. If I 
choose head and tail shows up, I will only receive 5 points. In contrast, if head shows up I will 
receive 5 * 2.5 = 12.5 points + 5 points = 17.5 points. Do you understand? How many points do 
you want to risk?   
 
Now, the third game (Public Goods Experiment Chapter 2 and 3).  
The outcome in this game depends on your decisions and the decisions of two others in this 
meeting. Note that you will never know who these two others are and these two others will 
never know that they played with you. You and the two others will have to make the same 
decision. Here are two envelopes. In one envelope, which is denoted your envelope, are 10 
points. These points are yours. The other, which is denoted your group envelope, is empty. You 
decide how many of the 10 points you transfer to your group envelope. What happens if you 
transfer points to your group envelope? First, of course, you will have fewer points in your 
envelope. Second, for every point you transfer to the group envelope, we will add 0.5 points. 
Thus, if you transfer for example 10 points, we will add 5 points and there will be 15 points in 
the group envelope. If you transfer nothing, we will not add points to the group envelope. What 
happens to the points in the group envelope? They will be equally distributed among all 
participants in your group including you. So, if there are 15 points in the group envelope, you 
and the other two in your group get 5 points. You do not know how many points the others 
  97
transfer to the group envelope. The other two participants in your group will also have to decide 
how many points they transfer to the group envelope before knowing the decisions of their 
group members.  
 
Let me give you an example. Imagine all three participants (including you) decide to transfer 
no points to the group envelope. Thus, there are no points in the group envelopes and all three 
participants stay with their 10 points in their private envelope. Imagine now all three 
participants including you decide to transfer all 10 points to the group account, i.e., there are 
30+0.5x30=45 points in the group envelopes. We will then divide the 45 points equally and 
each of you will receive 15 points. One last example: Imagine participant 1 gives 10 points to 
the group envelope, participant 2 gives 0 points to the group envelope und you give 5 points to 
the group envelope. We will then add 0.5 points for each point in the group envelopes, i.e. there 
are (10+0+5)x1.5=22.5 points. Then we divide these points equally among the three 
participants so that all get 7.5 points in addition to the points they kept in their individual 
envelopes. So, participant 1 gets 0+7,5=7,5 points, participant 2  10+7,5=17,5 points and you 
5+7,5=12,5 points. Note that participant 2 received more points than you and participant 1 
because he did not transfer any point to the group envelope. In contrast, participant 2 received 
less because he transferred all 10 points to the group envelope.  
 
Do you understand? While you make your decision, I will turn my back. Please do not tell me 
what you plan to do. Please decide now and transfer the amount of points you want from this 
envelope to the other and then put the two envelopes in the box in front of you. Tell me when 
you are ready!  
 
In this game you have an additional possibility to earn money. You can receive 5 more points if 
you guess correctly how many points the others transfer to the group envelope. You have two 
guesses.  
 
This is game 4 (Coordination Experiment, not reported in Chapter 2 and 3). 
In this game you will play with one other participant from this meeting but you do not know 
who, and the other participant does not know that s/he plays with you. You will not know until 
the end of the meeting how the other participant decided in this game. Imagine you are a 
hunter. You and the other participant have to make the following decision: Hunting a rabbit or a 
stag. The rabbit can be hunted individually but hunting the stag is only possible together. If you 
decide to hunt a rabbit you will get 7 points (= a rabbit is worth 7 points). If both of you decide 
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to hunt a stag you will both get 10 points (= a stag is worth 20 points). However, if you decide 
to hunt the stag and the other participant the rabbit, you will get no points (because you cannot 
hunt the stag alone) and the other will get 7 points (the rabbit can be hunted alone). Likewise, if 
you decide to hunt the rabbit and the other the stag, you will get 7 points and the other 0 points.  
 
Will you hunt the rabbit or the stag? What do you believe, how will the other participant 
decide? 
 
This is game 5 (Competition Experiment, not reported in Chapter 2 and 3). 
The goal of this game is to throw this tennis ball into the bucket. You have 10 tries. There are 
two options how you can earn money in this task. 
 
Option 1: For each ball which enters the bucket and stays in it, you will get 1 point. 
Option 2:You will play against another fisherman in this meeting but you do not know who. 
The fisherman who enters more balls in the bucket is the winner. Only the winner gets paid. He 
gets 3 points for each ball that enters the bucket, the loser gets nothing. In case, you and the 
other fisherman enter the same amount of balls in the bucket, there is no winner and both of 
you get 1 point for each ball entered. 
 
Which option do you choose? 
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A.1.2 Instructions for Laboratory Experiments in 2006 
 
Thank you for coming to today’s meeting. As gratification you receive 5 Reais. Today’s 
meeting can take up to 4 hours. Please note that you are free to leave this meeting at any point 
of time. We ask you to fill out a questionnaire together with one of our helpers. Moreover, we 
play two games with you. In both games, you have the possibility to earn money. You will be 
paid at the end of this meeting. Nobody besides me will know how much you will earn today. 
The payment will be private. You should know that the money comes from research funds and 
not from our own pockets or from the pocket of politicians. Please note that there is no right or 
wrong in playing the games. Please do not talk while playing the games. Participants who do 
not obey this rule cannot continue to play the game. During today’s session you will receive a 
code. This ensures that everything you do – your answers in the questionnaire and your 
decisions in the games – will remain anonymously.  
 
First Game (Public Goods Experiment, Chapter 2) 
In this game you will be in a group of four participants. No participant will know in which 
group he is. You will have the chance to earn money in this game. How much you will earn 
depends on your decisions and the decisions of the other three participants in your group. No 
participant will know how you decided. This experiment has 5 periods. The group composition 
does not change during these 5 periods. In each period, each group member makes one 
decision. The decision is the same for all participants. In this experiment, we will speak of 
points and 3 points are worth 1 Real. At the end of this game, we will add up the points you 
made during the 5 periods, divide them by three and pay you after you finished playing the 
second game. 
 
The setting: imagine that you are a fisherman and share a lake with three other fishermen. You 
all possess a small boat in which there are two fishnets, one fishnet with a small mesh size and 
one fishnet with a big mesh size.  
 
Your decision: you decide in each of the five periods (which is presented as a week) on how 
many of the seven days of a week you will use the fishnet with the small mesh size and on how 
many of the seven days of a week you will use the fishnet with the big mesh size. The fish god 
“Iara” gives you 10 points in each period. Iara will also give you for every day you will use a 
fishnet with a big mesh size 0.5 points. For every day you decide to use the fishnet with the 
small mesh size, Iara will give you 1 point, but at the same time reduce the balance of the other 
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three participants in your group by 0.5 points. You will know after you have made your 
decision how the other participants decided in the previous period. 
 
Example: 
(Explanation for all participants: experimenter is Iara, four helpers stand in front of all 
participants and represent one group. Experimenter gives each group member ten cards, each 
representing one point.) 
 
Iara asks the first group member: “On how many days of the first week will you use the fishnet 
with the big mesh size?” 
First group member replies: “On four days”. 
Iara gives the first group member four half cards (each representing one half point) 
Iara then gives the first group member three cards (each representing 0.5 points) for the 
decision to use on the remaining three days with the fishnet with the small mesh size. 
Iara approaches all three other group members and cuts three cards from each into two parts 
and takes half because the first group member decided to catch three days with the fishnet with 
a small mesh size. 
 
Iara asks the second group member: “On how many days of the first week will you use the 
fishnet with the big mesh size?” 
First group member replies: “On two days”. 
Iara gives the first group member two half cards (each representing 0.5 points) 
Iara then gives the second group member five cards (each representing one point) for the 
decision to use on the remaining three days with the fishnet with the small mesh size. 
Iara approaches all three other group members and cuts five cards from each into two parts and 
takes half because the first group member decided to catch five days with the fishnet with a 
small mesh size. 
 
Iara asks the third group member: “On how many days of the first week will you use the fishnet 
with the big mesh size?” 
First group member replies: “On seven days”. 
Iara gives the third group member seven half cards (each representing 0.5 points). 
 
Iara asks the fourth group member: “On how many days of the first week will you use the 
fishnet with the big mesh size?” 
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First group member replies: “On zero days”. 
Iara gives the fourth group member seven cards (each representing one point) for the decision 
to use all seven days the fishnet with the small mesh size. 
Iara approaches all three other group members and cuts seven cards from each into two parts 
and takes half because the first group member decided to catch seven days with the fishnet with 
a small mesh size. 
 
Iara asks the first group member: “Show me your cards!” 
First group member replies: “I have 1 card and 16 half cards” 
Iara asks the first group member: “So how many points do you have!” 
First group member replies: “I have 9 points!” 
Iara asks the first group member: “So how much money did you earn in the first week!” 
First group member replies: “I made 3 Reais!” 
 
Iara asks the second group member: “Show me your cards!” 
Second group member replies: “I have 5 cards and 12 half cards” 
Iara asks the second group member: “So how many points do you have!” 
Second group member replies: “I have 11 points!” 
Iara asks the second group member: “So how much money did you earn in the first week!” 
Second group member replies: “I made almost 4 Reais!” 
 
Iara asks the third group member: “Show me your cards!” 
Third group member replies: “I have 12 half cards” 
Iara asks the third group member: “So how many points do you have!” 
Third group member replies: “I have 6 points!” 
Iara asks the third group member: “So how much money did you earn in the first week!” 
Third group member replies: “I made 2 Reais!” 
 
Iara asks the fourth group member: “Show me your cards!” 
Fourth group member replies: “I have 9 cards and 8 half cards” 
Iara asks the fourth group member: “So how many points do you have!” 
Fourth group member replies: “I have 13 points!” 
Iara asks the fourth group member: “So how much money did you earn in the first week!” 
Fourth group member replies: “I made a bit more than 4 Reais!” 
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Questions: Is this clear? We will come to you, explain the game one more time individually, 
and, ask you about your decision.  
 
Second Game (Time Preference Experiment, Chapter 2 and 3) 
The second game is very simple. In this game, you decide whether you want to have a good 
today or more of the same good tomorrow. If you decide to have the good today, we will give it 
to you at the end of todays meeting. If you decide to have more of the same good tomorrow, we 
will give you a voucher to collect the good tomorrow in the village leader's house. Is this clear? 
 
You will decide over three different goods (the order of the presentation of the three goods was 
randomly determined) but you will only receive one of the three goods. After you have made 
your choice for the three different goods, you will draw a card that determines which of the 
three goods you will actually receive. Is this clear? 
 
Please tell me now your decision for the following three goods. Do you prefer:  
 1,5 L mineral water today  or  3 L mineral water tomorrow 
 1,5 Reais today  or   4 Reais tomorrow  
 12 bananas today or  24 bananas tomorrow. 
 
(The decision with regard to money and bananas are not reported in Chapter 2 and 3, the 
interested reader can consult for further information Fehr and Leibbrandt, 2008).
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A.2 Instructions for Laboratory Experiments (Chapter 4) 
 
A.2.1 Instructions for the Second Party in Treatment 2P 
We welcome you to our experiment. If you read the following instructions carefully you will be 
able to earn money in addition to your show up fee of 10 Swiss Francs – depending on your 
decisions and the decisions of the other participants. Therefore it is very important, that you 
read the following instructions carefully. If you have any question, please address them to us.  
During the experiment you are not allowed to talk to other participants. If you do not follow 
this rule we will have to exclude you from the experiment and you will not be able to earn 
money. In this experiment you will have to make one decision in ten different situations that 
can influence your payoff. The order of these ten situations is randomly determined. At the end 
of the experiment, a ten-sided dice will be thrown to determine which of the ten situations 
becomes relevant for your payment. In this experiment we always speak of points. 10 points are 
worth 1 Swiss Franc. 10 points = 1 Swiss Franc. 
 
There are two types of participants in this experiment: Participant A and participant B. You are 
participant B. You will never get to know the identity of any participant A (or B), nor will any 
participant A get to know who you are. The payment at the end of the experiment is also 
anonymous, that is, no other participant will know how much you earned in this experiment. 
 
Each of the ten situations consists of two stages. In the following, we will explain these two 
stages.  
 
The first stage 
In the first stage, participant A makes his decision. He can decide between two allocations. 
Take for instance the following example. If he decides for the allocation on the left side, he gets 
300 points and you get 100 points. If he decides for the allocation on the right side, he gets 250 
points and you get 150 points.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
A: 300 
B: 100 
A: 250 
B: 150 
A
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The second stage 
In the second stage, you make your decision. You can assign deduction points to participant A. 
Every deduction point you assign, reduces your payoff by 1 point and the payoff of participant 
B by 3 points. You can assign between 0 and 50 deduction points. For instance, if you assign 
50 deduction points, your payoff is reduced by 50 points and the payoff of participant B by 150 
points. If you assign 25 deduction points, your income is reduced by 25 points and the payoff 
of participant B by 75 points.  
 
Time Line of the Experiment 
You will have to decide how many deduction points you assign in all ten different situations 
before you know which allocation participant A has chosen in the first stage of the situations. 
We will present you the two different allocations in each situation and you will have to decide 
how many deduction points you assign in each allocation. While you are making your 
decisions, participant A will choose one allocation in each situation. After all participants A 
and B have made their decisions in the ten situations, the experiment is over. One situation will 
be randomly determined by a ten-sided dice and you will be paid according to your and 
participant A’s decision in this situation.  
 
Calculation of Payoffs 
The payoffs of participant A and B are calculated as follows: 
 
The payoff of participant A = 
+ Points for A in the allocation participant A has chosen in the game that 
was chosen by the dice 
– 3x  the deduction points you assigned to participant A in the game that 
was chosen by the dice 
 
Your payoff (participant B) = 
+ Points for B in the allocation participant A has chosen in the game that 
was chosen by the dice 
 – The deduction points you assigned to participant A in the game that was 
 chosen by the dice 
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In the second stage, you will have to decide how many deduction points you assign in the first 
situation. The following computer screen will appear:  
 
 
 
After that, you will make your decision in the second, third,…, tenth situation.  
You can take as much time as you need. The OK-Button appears with a little time delay.  
 
If you have made your decisions in all ten situations, you will be informed about your payoff.  
 
Please answer now the following control questions and raise your hand if you have answered 
them. The experiment starts as soon as all participants have correctly filled out the control 
questions.  
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1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Participant A chooses the allocation on the left side. 
a) Participant B assigns 0 deduction points to participant A. 
What is the payoff of participant  A? ..........    B?..........     
 
b) Participant B assigns 30 deduction points to participant A. 
What is the payoff of participant  A? ..........    B?..........     
 
 
2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Participant A chooses the allocation on the right side. 
a) Participant B assigns 0 deduction points to participant A. 
What is the payoff of participant  A? ..........    B?..........        
b) Participant B assigns 50 deduction points to participant A. 
What is the payoff of participant  A? ..........    B?..........        
 
Do you have any further questions? 
 
A: 300 
B: 100 
A: 250 
B: 150 
A
A: 200 
B: 250 
A: 300 
B: 50 
A
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A.2.2 Instructions for the Third Party in Treatment 3P 
We welcome you to our experiment. If you read the following instructions carefully you will be 
able to earn money in addition to your show up fee of 10 Swiss Francs – depending on your 
decisions and the decisions of the other participants. Therefore it is very important, that you 
read the following instructions carefully. If you have any question, please address them to us.  
During the experiment you are not allowed to talk to other participants. If you do not follow 
this rule we will have to exclude you from the experiment and you will not be able to earn 
money. In this experiment you will have to make one decision in ten different situations that 
can influence your payoff. The order of these ten situations is randomly determined. At the end 
of the experiment, a ten-sided dice will be thrown to determine which of the ten situations 
becomes relevant for your payment. In this experiment we always speak of points. 10 points are 
worth 1 Swiss Franc. 10 points = 1 Swiss Franc. There are three types of participants in this 
experiment: Participant A, participant B and participant C. You are participant C. You will 
never get to know the identity of any participant, nor will any participant get to know who you 
are. The payment at the end of the experiment is also anonymous, that is, no other participant 
will know how much you earned in this experiment.  
 
 
Each of the ten situations consists of two stages. In the following, we will explain these two 
stages.  
 
The first stage 
In the first stage, participant A makes his decision. He can decide between two allocations. 
Take for instance the following example. If he decides for the allocation on the left side, he gets 
300 points and B gets 100 points. If he decides for the allocation on the right side, he gets 250 
points and B gets 150 points. Independently of participant A’s choice, you will always get 200 
points in all ten situations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A: 300 
B: 100 
A: 250 
B: 150 
A
C: 200
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The second stage 
In the second stage, you make your decision. You can assign deduction points to participant A 
and/or participant B. Every deduction point you assign to participant A (or participant B), 
reduces your payoff by 1 point and the payoff of participant A (or B) by 3 points. You can 
assign in total between 0 and 50 deduction points. For instance, if you assign 50 deduction 
points to participant A, your payoff is reduced by 50 points and the payoff of participant A by 
150 points. If you assign 30 deduction points to participant B, your income is reduced by 30 
points and the payoff of participant B by 90 points.  
 
Time Line of the Experiment 
You will have to decide how many deduction points you assign in all ten different situations 
before you know which allocation participant A has chosen in the first stage of the situations. 
We will present you the two different allocations in each situation and you will have to decide 
how many deduction points you assign in each allocation. While you are making your 
decisions, participant A will choose one allocation in each situation and participant B will be 
asked how many deduction points you will assign. After all participants have made their 
decisions in the ten situations, the experiment is over. One situation will be randomly 
determined by a ten-sided dice and you will be paid according to your decision in this situation.  
 
 
Calculation of Payoffs 
The payoffs of participant A, B and C are calculated as follows: 
 
The payoff of participant A = 
+ Points for A in the allocation participant A has chosen in the game that 
was chosen by the dice 
– 3x  the deduction points you assigned to participant A in the game that 
was chosen by the dice 
 
The payoff of participant B = 
+ Points for B in the allocation participant A has chosen in the game that 
was chosen by the dice 
– 3x  the deduction points you assigned to participant B in the game that 
was chosen by the dice 
 
  109
Your payoff (participant C) = 
 + 200 Points (your endowment) 
 – The deduction points you assigned to participants A and/or B in the game 
 that was chosen by the dice 
 
 
 
In the second stage, you will have to decide how many deduction points you assign in the first 
situation. The following computer screen will appear:  
 
 
 
After that, you will make your decision in the second, third,…, tenth situation.  You can take as 
much time as you need. The OK-Button appears with a little time delay. If you have made your 
decisions in all ten situations, you will be informed about your payoff. Please answer now the 
following control questions and raise your hand if you have answered them. The experiment 
starts as soon as all participants have correctly filled out the control questions.  
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1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Participant A chooses the allocation on the left side. 
a) Participant C assigns 0 deduction points to participant B. 
What is the payoff of participant        A? ..........    B?..........       C?............ 
 
b) Participant C assigns 30 deduction points to participant B. 
What is the payoff of participant        A? ..........    B?..........     C?............ 
 
 
2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Participant A chooses the allocation on the right side. 
a) Participant C assigns 0 deduction points to participant A. 
What is the payoff of participant        A? ..........    B?..........       C?............ 
 
b) Participant C assigns 50 deduction points to participant A. 
What is the payoff of participant        A? ..........    B?..........     C?............ 
 
Do you have any further questions? 
A: 300 
B: 100 
A: 250 
B: 150 
A
C: 200 
A: 200 
B: 250 
A: 300 
B: 50 
A
C: 200 
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